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PREEMPTING THE POLICE 
DAVID M. JAROS* 
Abstract: The challenge of regulating police discretion is exacerbated by the fact 
that a great deal of questionable police activity exists in the legal shadows—
unregulated practices that do not violate defined legal limits because they have 
generally eluded both judicial and legislative scrutiny. Local law enforcement 
strategies, like the maintenance of unauthorized police DNA databases and the 
routine practice of initiating casual street encounters, threaten fundamental no-
tions of a free society but have largely failed to elicit a judicial or legislative re-
sponse. This Article argues that, instead of establishing a floor for impermissible 
police misconduct and then ceding responsibility to the legislative branch, state 
courts should become more interventionist—prodding legislators to provide 
greater guidance about police activities that they condone by forcing them to ex-
plicitly endorse questionable police practices. Accordingly, state courts should 
use the intrastate preemption doctrine, which holds that state law can supplant 
municipal authority, to find that local police officers may not engage in certain 
activities. Rather than stifle municipal policy innovation, a finding of preemption 
can precipitate a policy debate that engages both legislators and the electorate in 
evaluating police activity. This “information-forcing” approach can promote a 
more democratic dialogue about police practices, provide stronger protections for 
the community, and confer greater legitimacy on the police activities that legisla-
tors choose to sanction. 
INTRODUCTION 
How do we police the police? The practicalities of fighting crime require 
that we vest the police with extensive discretion so that they can effectively 
identify and arrest criminal activity. Unfortunately, the nature of police work, 
and the political and social context in which police officers function, make it 
difficult to ensure that this power is not abused. Striking an appropriate bal-
ance between civil liberty interests and pressing public safety concerns is par-
ticularly difficult because a great deal of questionable police activity exists in 
the legal shadows—unregulated practices that do not violate defined legal lim-
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its because they have generally eluded both judicial and legislative scrutiny. 
Law enforcement strategies, like the maintenance of unauthorized police DNA 
databases and the routine practice of initiating casual street encounters, threat-
en fundamental notions of a free society but have largely failed to elicit either a 
judicial or legislative response. 
Given the significant challenges of regulating police conduct effectively,1 
it’s not surprising that there is little agreement about which governmental 
branch should be tasked with policing the police. Since the Warren Court’s 
revolution of criminal procedure, the primary approach to regulating law en-
forcement has been to rely on the Constitution and the judiciary to establish 
threshold standards to restrain the police.2 Seminal U.S. Supreme Court cases 
like Monroe v. Pape,3 Mapp v. Ohio,4 and Miranda v. Arizona5 established the 
courts as the institution primarily responsible for reining in police miscon-
duct.6 Many have argued, however, that the Supreme Court’s decisions regulat-
ing law enforcement have pushed judges beyond the limits of their institutional 
capacity,7 produced poorly developed or inadequate rules for officers in the 
field,8 and led courts to overstep their legal authority to regulate police mis-
                                                                                                                           
 1 See Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 762 (2012) (describ-
ing the many challenges to regulating police activities). 
 2 See id. at 763 (“The problem of regulating police power through law has been shoehorned into 
the narrow confines of constitutional criminal procedure.”); see also Anthony G. Amsterdam, The 
Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 790 (1970) 
(“[T]he ubiquitous lack of legislative and executive attention to the problems of police treatment of 
suspects . . . forces the Court into the role of lawmaker in this area . . . .”); Daniel J. Solove, Fourth 
Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr’s Misguided Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM 
L. REV. 747, 747 (2005) (“Since the criminal procedure revolution of the Warren Court era, the courts 
have been the primary rule makers in the field of criminal procedure.”). 
 3 See generally 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (applying Federal Civil Rights law to constitutional viola-
tions by city employees). 
 4 See generally 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (mandating the exclusion of evidence gained through consti-
tutional violations from the police). 
 5 See generally 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (excluding statement by accused when police fail to inform 
of them of their constitutional rights). 
 6 Harmon, supra note 1, at 766 (“If the holdings in Monroe, Mapp, Katz, and Miranda enabled 
courts to regulate police conduct, their reasoning established courts, especially federal courts, as the 
primary institution for performing this task.”); Solove, supra note 2, at 747. 
 7 See Harmon, supra note 1, at 764 (“[C]ourts lack the institutional capacity to undertake complex 
empirical analysis of policing or to constrain the police beyond identifying and enforcing constitution-
al rights.”); Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and 
the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 805 (2004) (arguing that courts are ill-equipped to 
develop protective rules in cases involving developing technologies). 
 8 See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 757 (1994) 
(arguing that the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment jurisprudence regarding warrant requirements 
and probable cause for all searches is “misguided”); Gerald M. Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 
VAND. L. REV. 1417, 1473–74 (1985) (accepting the Court’s application of the Constitution to regu-
late police conduct, but questioning the scope of the Miranda decision). 
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conduct.9 Indeed, some scholars contend that the judiciary’s mere involvement 
in efforts to regulate the police exacerbates the problem by crowding out or 
excusing lawmakers from complementary legislative action.10 
Several scholars claim that the legislative branch enjoys more legitimacy, 
flexibility, and authority to define procedural rules for the police—particularly 
in areas where rapid technological change constantly reshapes how police con-
duct investigations and how criminals break the law.11 Unfortunately, although 
egregious cases of police misconduct can temporarily galvanize the public and, 
for a short time, their representatives, the politics of crime tends to deter politi-
cians from taking an active role in limiting police power.12 Thus, even if the 
legislative branch has certain institutional advantages with respect to identify-
ing and instituting rules governing police conduct, it may be difficult to con-
vince politicians to take on the task. Critics therefore argue that regulating po-
lice conduct must necessarily fall to the courts.13 
                                                                                                                           
 9 See Henry J. Friendly, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, 53 CALIF. L. REV. 
929, 954 (1965) (“The Bill of Rights ought not to be read as prohibiting the development of ‘workable 
rules,’ or as requiring the states forever to conform their criminal procedures to the preferences of five 
Justices . . . .”); see also Daniel J. Solove, Fourth Amendment Pragmatism, 51 B.C. L. REV. 1511, 
1513–15 (arguing that courts’ current approach to the Fourth Amendment has “led to a complicated 
morass of doctrines and theories” and also ignored problems caused by “inadequately constrained 
government power, lack of accountability of law enforcement officials, and excessive police discre-
tion”).  
 10 See William J. Stuntz, The Political Constitution of Criminal Justice, 119 HARV. L. REV. 780, 
792 (2006) (“The Court drove legislators, along with the dollars they control, away from those areas 
where legislation might have done the most good (policing and procedure), and into those areas where 
it is bound to do the most harm (crime definition and sentencing).”); see also David A. Sklansky, 
Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1295 (2002) 
(suggesting that the Miranda decision, and the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule “may have 
slowed legislative innovation by a kind of informal preemption, occupying the field and providing a 
single, pre-approved solution”). 
 11 See Harmon, supra note 1, at 776–77 (explaining that, because constitutional criminal proce-
dure rights set “unbreakable rules,” they must be more generous to law enforcement than a true meas-
ure of the interests at stake); Kerr, supra note 7, at 857–81 (describing the advantages that legislatures 
have when it comes to regulating police activity involving new technologies). The inflexibility of 
constitutional rules also means that courts can only set the actual limits of police behavior rather than 
identify a standard for how law enforcement should behave. See Harmon, supra note 1, at 776–77. 
 12 See Sara Sun Beale, What’s Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychological and 
Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of (Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BUFF. CRIM. L. 
REV. 23, 29 (1997) (“The epithet ‘soft on crime’ is the contemporary equivalent of ‘soft on Com-
munism.’ In the United States, politicians have learned that to win you need to convince the public 
that you are tough on crime.”). But see Erin Murphy, The Politics of Privacy in the Criminal Justice 
System: Information Disclosure, the Fourth Amendment, and Statutory Law Enforcement Exemptions, 
111 MICH. L. REV. 485, 537 (2013) (noting that Congress has, at times, demonstrated a greater will-
ingness to protect privacy concerns than the courts). 
 13 See William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 529 
(2001) (describing powerful legislative incentives to give police and prosecutors broad discretion to 
fight crime); see also David Michael Jaros, Perfecting Criminal Markets, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1947, 
1978–79 (2012) (“For several decades, the politics of crime have been dominated by forces which 
1152 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1149 
Increasingly, scholars have recognized that an effective regime for regulat-
ing the police will require the active involvement of multiple institutions apply-
ing complementary approaches to curtailing improper police conduct.14 Unfor-
tunately, a coordinated approach to regulating the police is difficult to construct. 
A coordinated regulatory regime cannot simply encourage both the legislature 
and the judiciary to regulate the police in parallel fashion. Each institution must 
instead adopt strategies which both conscript its sister branch of government into 
the regulatory regime and compensate for the other institution’s weaknesses.15  
For the judiciary, this may mean reversing its approach to police regulation. 
Traditionally, courts have established a basic floor for impermissible police mis-
conduct and then ceded responsibility for checking police activity to a legislative 
branch with arguably greater expertise. Instead, in some cases, the judiciary 
should become more interventionist—encouraging state legislators to provide 
greater guidance about police activities that the legislature condones by forcing 
them to endorse questionable police practices explicitly. This “information-
forcing”16 or “clear statement”17 approach, which scholars have proposed in oth-
er contexts, would prompt a more democratic dialogue regarding police practices 
that often escape public scrutiny and confer greater legitimacy on police activi-
ties that legislators choose to sanction. 
To illustrate how such a dynamic approach might work, this Article exam-
ines how the “intrastate preemption” doctrine—a doctrine associated with the 
distribution of power between state and local governments—can improve the 
regulation of some police activities that, to date, have escaped efforts at over-
sight or control. Intrastate preemption occurs when state law precludes local 
                                                                                                                           
tend to promote punitive approaches that have been regarded as unproductive by many criminal jus-
tice experts.”). 
 14 See, e.g., Harmon, supra note 1, at 817 (describing the need to allocate among various institu-
tions “the complex task of articulating and implementing a form of policing that is both effective and 
harm efficient”); Murphy, supra note 12, at 537 (arguing that “it is undesirable for either the Court or 
Congress to assume sole or even primary responsibility for regulating privacy in the twenty-first cen-
tury”). 
 15 Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95 
GEO. L.J. 693, 728 (2007) (“A second and perhaps larger lesson for institutional reformists is the need 
to combine institutions in a way that maximizes their respective capabilities to correct or compensate 
for underlying participatory imbalances.”); see Sklansky, supra note 10, at 1232–33 (suggesting that 
courts adopt “strategies designed to promote ongoing dialogue between the judiciary on the one hand 
and the political branches on the other”). 
 16 See, e.g., Catherine M. Sharkey, Products Liability Preemption: An Institutional Approach, 76 
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 449, 457 (2008) (suggesting that a justification for courts refusing to preempt 
state products liability laws is that such a strategy is “information-forcing”). 
 17 See Cass R. Sunstein, Is the Clean Air Act Unconstitutional?, 98 MICH. L. REV. 303, 359 
(1999) (“[T]he clear statement principles are a paradigmatic form of ‘democracy-promoting minimal-
ism.’ They reflect a cautious judicial role, one that does not preempt democratic processes but instead 
attempts to fortify them, by ensuring that certain sensitive questions receive explicit and sustained 
attention from the national legislature.”); see also Cass R. Sunstein, Justice Scalia’s Democratic For-
malism, 107 YALE L.J. 529, 533 (1997). 
2014] Preempting the Police 1153 
governments from exercising their authority in a particular field.18 Critics often 
accuse the intrastate preemption doctrine of stifling municipal policy innova-
tion by allowing powerful business and industry groups to block local demo-
cratic efforts to advance important community interests, such as environmental 
protection and public safety.19 In fact, the doctrine has decidedly different im-
plications depending upon the political strength of the parties involved.20 
When the doctrine is applied to statutes implicating police conduct and histori-
cally disfranchised groups, a finding that state law preempts the police from 
engaging in problematic discretionary activities may actually precipitate a pol-
icy debate that engages both legislators and the electorate in evaluating police 
activity that would otherwise avoid scrutiny. 
Law enforcement practices that occur outside the boundaries of the law 
undermine the legitimacy of the police and reduce the public’s respect for the 
law.21 By preempting certain police practices, courts can promote a dialogue 
about police activities that currently reside in a legal wilderness. Moreover, 
when prodded to act, legislatures have not always favored unbridled police 
discretion. Some states, after considering the benefits of collecting genetic pro-
files of their citizens, have chosen to include various protections that expressly 
limit how those databases can be used.22 
This Article focuses on law enforcement regulation at the state, rather 
than federal level, for several related reasons. First, the police, as municipal 
employees, do not have inherent powers to act. Instead their authority is entire-
                                                                                                                           
 18 See Paul Diller, Intrastate Preemption, 87 B.U. L. REV. 1113, 1116 (2007) (describing the 
intrastate preemption doctrine and its impact on local policy innovation); see also Paul S. Weiland, 
Federal and State Preemption of Environmental Law: A Critical Analysis, 24 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 
237, 237 (2000) (“[P]reemption is a simultaneous expansion in power of a higher level of government 
and reduction in power of a lower level of government.”). 
 19 See, e.g., Diller, supra note 18, at 1140 (“[B]usinesses also frequently turn to the courts to 
overturn local regulations they dislike. . . .”); Darwin Farrar, In Defense of Home Rule: California’s 
Preemption of Local Firearms Regulation, 7 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 51, 55–57 (1996) (describing 
how state law has been used to preempt local gun control regulations); Matthew J. Parlow, Progres-
sive Policy-Making on the Local Level: Rethinking Traditional Notions of Federalism, 17 TEMP. POL. 
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 371, 376 (2008) (questioning “the wisdom of the current preemption doctrine 
that limits local governments’ ability to be Petri dishes for innovative policies”); Daniel B. Rodriguez, 
Localism and Lawmaking, 32 RUTGERS L.J. 627, 640 (2001) (suggesting that implied preemption 
creates “severe constraints on local innovation and choice”); Paul S. Weiland, Preemption of Local 
Efforts to Protect the Environment: Implications for Local Government Officials, 18 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 
467, 505 (1999) (“[P]reemption may actually restrict legitimate efforts to protect human health and 
the environment . . . .”). 
 20 See infra notes 90–164 and accompanying text.  
 21 See Erik Luna, Transparent Policing, 85 IOWA L. REV. 1107, 1119 (2000) (“Mistrust of the 
police not only undermines the perceived authority of the law and agent in question, but also the legit-
imacy of all laws and all officials.”). 
 22 See Erin Murphy, Relative Doubt: Familial Searches of DNA Databases, 109 MICH. L. REV. 
291, 297 (2010) (discussing Maryland statute barring the police from conducting familial searches 
with the statewide database). 
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ly delegated to them from the state by either statute or constitutional provi-
sion.23 Second, unregulated police practices—like “rogue” DNA databases and 
“stop and talk” strategies—occur at the municipal level without any express 
authorization or debate by the state legislature. Third, although the federal 
government has, on occasion, sought to curb police misconduct,24 federal au-
thority to regulate the police is relatively limited when it comes to police activ-
ity that doesn’t implicate a constitutional right.25 Moreover, even if the federal 
government had the power to act, questionable law enforcement activities may 
not garner sufficient attention at the federal level to reliably elicit a legislative 
response.26 Finally, state legislatures and courts have traditionally shouldered 
significant responsibility in designing and overseeing criminal procedure.27 
John Hart Ely famously suggested that courts should intervene when the 
political process fails to protect minority interests.28 Generally, Professor Ely’s 
                                                                                                                           
 23 See State v. Backstrand, 313 P.3d 1084, 1111 (Or. 2013) (“The community caretaking statute is 
not an exception to the warrant requirement; it is the statutory expression of the well-settled precept 
that the actions of law enforcement officers, like all other government actors’ actions, must be tracea-
ble to some grant of authority from a politically accountable body.”); see also Reynolds v. Sims, 377 
U.S. 533, 575 (1964) (“Political subdivisions of States—counties, cities, or whatever—never were and 
never have been considered as sovereign entities. Rather, they have been traditionally regarded as 
subordinate governmental instrumentalities created by the State to assist in the carrying out of state 
governmental functions.”); William D. McElyea, Playing the Numbers: Local Government Authority 
to Apply Use Quotas in Neighborhood Commercial Districts, 14 ECOLOGY L.Q. 325, 335 (1987) (“A 
local government has no inherent police power; therefore, as a subdivision of the state, it only pos-
sesses powers delegated to it by the state.”). 
 24 See Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 
378–79 (1974) (explaining that legislatures are largely reluctant to regulate police behavior). 
 25 See U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitu-
tion, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”); see 
also United States v. Orso, 275 F.3d 1190, 1190–91 (9th Cir. 2001) (“To begin, let us remember that 
this court does not sit as a kind of super-Citizens’ Police Review Board, creating some set of federal 
common-law police regulations for local law enforcement officers in this circuit by distinguishing, on 
a case-by-case basis, ‘good’ police conduct from ‘bad.’”); id. at 1191 (“Instead, our only proper role 
in this context is to determine whether police conduct has in some way rendered the admission of 
evidence at a criminal trial violative of a defendant’s constitutional rights. In short, not everything that 
this court might consider ‘bad’ (or ‘improper’) is accordingly unconstitutional.”). 
 26 See Sanford Levinson, Why It’s Smart to Think About Constitutional Stupidities, 17 GA. ST. U. 
L. REV. 359, 371 (2000) (“Congress is very, very busy. It is no easy matter to capture Congress’ atten-
tion on any given issue, especially one that has not captured widespread public attention and when the 
polls do not indicate that a legislator’s investing his or her scarce time and energy on that issue will 
win any votes.”). 
 27 Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and Criminal Law: What the Feds Can Learn from the States, 
109 MICH. L. REV. 519, 522 (2011) (explaining that “states have the primary responsibility for law 
enforcement in the United States”). 
 28 JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 76 (1980) 
(suggesting that it is the function of the courts to “keep the machinery of democratic government 
working as it should, to make sure the channels of political participation and communication are kept 
open” and that the judiciary should “concern itself with what majorities do to minorities”); Harold 
Hongju Koh, War and Responsibility in the Dole-Gingrich Congress, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 2–3 
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arguments have been used to justify the use of heightened scrutiny when courts 
evaluate the constitutionality of government activity affecting “discrete and 
insulated minorities.”29 The potential for intrastate preemption to stimulate a 
public debate over questionable police practices suggests that there may be 
other roles that courts can play when it comes to protecting minority interests. 
Rather than circumvent the democratic process with rigid constitutional pro-
nouncements, courts can use the intrastate preemption doctrine to make sure 
that minority perspectives are debated in a public forum. This less intrusive 
means of intervention can help develop rules that dictate, not only the outer 
limits to what police can do, but rules for how we want them to act. Such a 
strategy can ultimately yield greater legitimacy for the police, stronger protec-
tions for the community, and a more effective functioning democracy. 
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I delves further into the chal-
lenges of regulating police conduct and identifies how particular obstacles to 
police regulation suggest distinct roles and strategies for the institutions tasked 
with curtailing police misconduct.30 Part II examines the use of the intrastate 
preemption doctrine at the state level and suggests that, contrary to the cri-
tiques leveled at its application in cases involving business and environmental 
regulation, a robust preemption doctrine can facilitate policy experimentation 
and increase civic engagement when it is applied to statutes that implicate po-
lice conduct.31 Part III examines two instances of troubling police conduct—
the maintenance of unauthorized police DNA databases and the routine prac-
tice of making casual street stops that arguably do not rise to the level of a con-
stitutionally impermissible seizure—and explores the impact that adoption of a 
robust intrastate preemption doctrine would have on identifying and curtailing 
undesirable police conduct.32 
I. THE CHALLENGES OF REGULATING THE POLICE: COMPARING JUDICIAL 
AND LEGISLATIVE STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES 
In light of the difficulties of regulating police conduct effectively, it is not 
surprising that there is little agreement about which branch of government 
should be tasked with policing the police.33 Indeed, scholars’ estimation of 
                                                                                                                           
(1995) (“Democracy and Distrust developed the notion that judges should intervene when they have 
reason to distrust the political process . . . .”). 
 29 See United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (suggesting that height-
ened scrutiny may be justified when “prejudice against discrete and insular minorities” curtail the 
operation of political processes that ordinarily protect minorities). 
 30 See infra notes 33–89 and accompanying text. 
 31 See infra notes 90–164 and accompanying text. 
 32 See infra notes 165–274 and accompanying text. 
 33 Compare Kerr, supra note 7, at 805 (arguing that the courts are ill-equipped to develop rules to 
govern law enforcement investigatory practices that involve new technologies), with Solove, supra 
note 2, at 761 (“Kerr is too quick to extol the virtues of Congress and . . . is especially misguided in 
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whether the legislative or judicial branch is in the best position to curtail unde-
sirable police activity tends to depend on the specific obstacle on which the 
particular scholar chooses to focus. This is not to suggest that “Comparative In-
stitutional Analysis”34 does not offer valuable insights into the problem of po-
licing. Rather, the error that scholars tend to make is that they evaluate the 
relative strengths of the two branches of government with an eye towards pick-
ing a single institutional winner.35 Instead, by examining how each challenge 
inhibits each institution, it is possible to identify ways in which the two 
branches can complement each other’s efforts.36 
Conspicuously absent from this analysis is the role that the executive 
branch plays in regulating its own conduct. The executive branch and, more 
importantly, independent agencies, such as civilian complaint review boards, 
have been moderately successful in identifying and punishing police conduct 
that violates accepted standards of policing.37 The executive branch, however, 
demonstrates little interest in reining in police activity that does not violate 
clearly defined legal standards. Likewise, independent review boards lack the 
authority to impose limits on police activity that is not clearly proscribed by 
law.38 As a result, the following analysis focuses primarily on the strengths and 
weaknesses of the judicial and legislative branches. 
                                                                                                                           
suggesting that courts take a back seat to legislatures in creating criminal procedure rules for new 
technologies.”). 
 34 “Comparative Institutional Analysis” is a method for identifying the best (or least flawed) insti-
tution to resolve a legal issue. See Susan Freiwald, Comparative Institutional Analysis in Cyberspace: 
The Case of Intermediary Liability for Defamation, 14 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 569, 575 (2001) (“As a 
positive matter, the analysis predicts the different outcomes that will arise in various institutional 
settings based on the actors’ incentives in each setting. As a normative matter, comparative institu-
tional analysis chooses the best institution by determining the outcome that best furthers a particular 
social policy goal.”); Neil K. Komesar, Exploring the Darkness: Law, Economics, and Institutional 
Choice, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 465, 465–66. See generally NEIL K. KOMESAR, IMPERFECT ALTERNA-
TIVES: CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS IN LAW, ECONOMICS AND PUBLIC POLICY (1994) (providing further 
discussion). 
 35 Wagner, supra note 15, at 728 (“Rather than conceiving of comparative institutional analysis as 
a horse race that seeks out a single institutional winner with respect to resolving a social problem, the 
best institutional response may be a mix of institutions that enter the decision-making process at dif-
ferent points in the life cycle of an issue or offer different services to overcome different types of 
participation deficiencies.”). 
 36 See, e.g., id. at 695 (identifying the potential for private tort litigation to complement agency 
efforts to regulate dangerous products). 
 37 See Hazel Glenn Beh, Municipal Liability for Failure to Investigate Citizen Complaints 
Against Police, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 209, 220 (1998) (suggesting that civilian review boards can 
help resolve bias and intimidation problems related to police complaints, but also noting such boards’ 
limits). 
 38 See Stephen Clarke, Arrested Oversight: A Comparative Analysis and Case Study of How Ci-
vilian Oversight of the Police Should Function and How It Fails, 43 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 1, 1–
2 (2009) (describing the function of civilian review boards). 
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A. Identifying Undesirable Police Behavior 
When considering which government branch is best equipped to regulate 
police activity, scholars tend to ignore the basic question of how the legislature 
and the judiciary identify police activity that needs regulation.39 This Section 
addresses both why identifying problematic police conduct is difficult,40 and 
describes the judiciary’s41 and the legislature’s42 relative strengths and weak-
nesses in locating police activity that requires attention.  
Police officers are tasked with combatting a broad spectrum of criminal 
activity in vastly differing circumstances. Moreover, policing implicates a wide 
variety of interrelated interests from privacy rights to the freedom to travel to 
more general community interests in safety and economic security. The multi-
tude of cases police officers handle, the variety of issues that arise as officers 
seek to protect the public, and the need to respect individual constitutional in-
terests, create a significant challenge for any institution tasked with identifying 
police practices that need regulation. 
Scholarly discussions describing “hidden police abuses” tend to focus on 
the most apparent and egregious behaviors, including physical abuse, witness 
intimidation, and falsifying evidence.43 Such instances of misconduct are diffi-
cult to expose, but there is little doubt that they occur and that they violate any 
acceptable standard of policing. Other police conduct—such as individual in-
vestigation practices and other discretionary activities—may not readily be 
apparent to regulators.44 It is, therefore, critical that the institutions tasked with 
regulating police conduct are capable of identifying police activities that re-
quire supervision and control. 
Although scholars suggest that legislatures have abdicated their responsi-
bility for managing police conduct,45 both the legislative and judicial branches, 
in fact, play an important role in identifying police activity that warrants some 
form of intervention. Moreover, because the two regimes rely on different 
                                                                                                                           
 39 See generally, e.g., Kerr, supra note 7, at 857–60 (discussing whether courts or legislatures are 
more equipped to regulate new technologies without discussion on how to determine which technolo-
gies need regulation). 
 40 See infra notes 40–71, and accompanying text.  
 41 See infra notes 46–57, and accompanying text. 
 42 See infra notes 58–73, and accompanying text. 
 43 See, e.g., Luna, supra note 21, at 1112–13 (describing “hidden police abuses” involving physi-
cal abuse, witness intimidation, and racial discrimination); see also Kami Chavis Simmons, Coopera-
tive Federalism and Police Reform: Using Congressional Spending Power to Promote Police Ac-
countability, 62 ALA. L. REV. 351, 360 (2011) (“Typically, the concept of police misconduct conjures 
images of police officers physically abusing criminal suspects . . . .”). 
 44 Debra Livingston, Police Reform and the Department of Justice: An Essay on Accountability, 2 
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 815, 818 (1999) (“Scholars have long lamented that the ‘low visibility’ of much 
police work is a factor that complicates—or even frustrates—the supervision of line officers.”). 
 45 Amsterdam, supra note 24, at 378–79; see Solove, supra note 2, at 763 (describing the “nu-
merous technologies Congress has failed to regulate”). 
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mechanisms to alert them to undesirable police conduct, each branch uncovers 
activity that the other branch might not detect. 
Courts generally identify policing issues when they are contested through 
the criminal process. Indeed, one of the concerns associated with the rise of 
plea-bargaining and the decline of the criminal trial is the fear that problematic 
police activity will not be identified before the defendant pleads guilty.46 
Courts have proven relatively effective at identifying questionable investiga-
tion practices that produce evidence prosecutors might seek to use at trial. Po-
lice interrogation techniques,47 identification procedures,48 and practices relat-
ed to various kinds of physical and electronic searches49 have been identified 
by courts as potential areas of abuse when defendants have challenged the 
“fruit” of questionable police conduct. 
Although court decisions restricting standing for injunctive relief has ham-
pered some efforts to use civil suits to promote police reform,50 civil litigation 
also helps to draw attention to problematic police activity.51 Lawsuits challeng-
ing police conduct that involved denying suspects their right to counsel,52 physi-
cally coercing involuntary confessions,53 and suppressing exculpatory evi-
dence54 have shined a light on additional police activities in need of regulation. 
                                                                                                                           
 46 See Stephanos Bibas, Response, Exacerbating Injustice, 157 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 53, 
56 (2008), http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/260, archived at http://perma.cc/
BP22-GKVX (expressing concern that guilty pleas forego trials that could expose “unjust arrests, 
crooked police informants, testilying, racial profiling, and the like”); see also Steven Zeidman, Polic-
ing the Police: The Role of the Courts and the Prosecution, 32 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 315, 330 (2005) 
(“For too long, police corruption has been buried under an avalanche of guilty pleas . . . .”). 
 47 See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 456 (1966) (holding that a defendant’s responses 
to custodial interrogation may not be used against the defendant unless law enforcement advise the 
defendant of certain rights). 
 48 See, e.g., Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 383 (1968) (acknowledging that “[I]mproper 
employment of photographs by police may sometimes cause witnesses to err in identifying criminals.”). 
 49 See, e.g., Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 27 (2001) (challenging the use of a thermal im-
aging device to detect infrared radiation emanating from the suspect’s house). 
 50 See, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 105–06 (1983) (dismissing suit seeking 
an injunction preventing police from using illegal chokeholds because plaintiff could not establish real 
and immediate threat that he would be stopped by the police and be choked into unconsciousness in 
the future). 
 51 See, e.g., Floyd v. City of New York, 813 F. Supp. 2d 417, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (alleging that 
New York City police officers stop and frisk suspects based upon their race); see also Casale v. Kelly, 
710 F. Supp. 2d 347, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (challenging police enforcement of three unconstitutional 
New York loitering statutes after the judicial invalidation of those laws). Indeed, even litigation losses 
can help mobilize public pressure and promote a positive political response. See Douglas NeJaime, 
Winning Through Losing, 96 IOWA L. REV. 941, 944 (2011) (“[W]ins in court may not directly pro-
duce the desired results but may nonetheless provide a favorable environment for the social move-
ment’s broader reform campaign.”). 
 52 See, e.g., Cooper v. Dupnik, 963 F.2d 1220, 1248–49 (9th Cir. 1992) (en banc) (holding that 
deliberately denying a defendant the right to counsel “shocks the conscience” and was therefore ac-
tionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 as a violation of substantive due process). 
 53 See, e.g., Duncan v. Nelson, 466 F.2d 939, 941, 945 (7th Cir. 1972) (determining that plaintiff 
had standing to sue when police officers sought to elicit a confession by placing the suspect in the 
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Courts are less adept, however, at identifying policing behavior that does 
not directly implicate the trial process. Police practices that may disturb the 
public but do not breach established constitutional boundaries are unlikely to 
be investigated and exposed in the course of a defendant’s trial.55 For example, 
as discussed below, if defendants lack a legitimate expectation of privacy in 
their “abandoned DNA” then a court may have little reason to investigate a 
police department’s unauthorized DNA database.56 Similarly, questionable ar-
rest tactics may never come to light if prosecutors offer defendants attractive 
plea bargains early in the criminal process.57 
Unlike the courts, legislators can rely on media reports and political lobby-
ing to identify policing concerns. Although courts typically see only the infor-
mation as developed through the record,58 legislatures can proactively solicit 
information from agencies, experts, and the general public.59 Indeed, because 
constituents and interest groups routinely lobby legislators, legislatures can gath-
er substantial information on a variety of issues with relative ease.60 So long as 
not-for-profit organizations exist at the state level and can voice less influential 
constituents’ concerns,61 legislators can gather and assimilate vast quantities of 
information when they are adequately motivated to investigate police activities. 
Despite politicians’ notorious reluctance to regulate the police,62 there 
have been notable instances in which legislatures have identified and sought to 
regulate problematic police conduct. For instance, in the wake of the brutal 
                                                                                                                           
“hole,” a form of solitary confinement, for eighteen days, where he slept on the floor, received one 
meal a day, and saw neither family nor friends). 
 54 See, e.g., Jones v. City of Chicago, 856 F.2d 985, 988 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding police officers 
liable for conspiring to suppress evidence of suspect’s innocence). 
 55 See supra note 40 and accompanying text. 
 56 Cf. Elizabeth E. Joh, Reclaiming “Abandoned” DNA: The Fourth Amendment and Genetic 
Privacy, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 857, 865 (2006) (“With abandoned DNA, existing Fourth Amendment 
law appears not to apply at all.”). 
 57 See M. Chris Fabricant, Rethinking Criminal Defense Clinics in “Zero-Tolerance” Policing 
Regimes, 36 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 351, 376–77 (2012) (describing the practice of offering 
non-criminal pleas on questionable arrests for criminal trespass and that “[d]eclining this offer and 
contesting the charges requires a commitment of resources and perseverance that privilege assumes 
and poverty precludes”). 
 58 Harmon, supra note 1, at 773 (arguing that, when deciding criminal procedure cases, courts are 
unable to incorporate empirical data into normative judgments); Kerr, supra note 7, at 875 (“The in-
formation environment of judicial rulemaking is usually poor. Judges decide cases based primarily on 
a brief factual record, narrowly argued legal briefs, and a short oral argument.”). 
 59 Kerr, supra note 7, at 875 (“Legislative rules tend to be the product of a wide range of inputs, 
ranging from legislative hearings and poll results to interest group advocacy and backroom compro-
mises.”). 
 60 Id. 
 61 See infra note 164 and accompanying text. 
 62 See Amsterdam, supra note 24, at 378–79; Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote 
Four, and the Theory of Public Choice; or, Why Don’t Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of 
the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1079 (1993); Stuntz, supra note 13, at 529–30. 
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beating of Rodney King by Los Angeles police officers, Congress held hear-
ings and ultimately passed legislation authorizing the attorney general to sue 
localities in which there was “a pattern or practice of conduct by law enforce-
ment officials” that would deprive a person of “rights, privileges, or immuni-
ties secured or protected by the Constitution or laws of the United States.”63 At 
the state level, grassroots women’s rights advocates, frustrated by police offic-
ers’ unwillingness to arrest domestic abusers, successfully lobbied legislators 
in the early 1990s to adopt mandatory arrest laws that would compel officers to 
charge suspected batterers with a crime.64 
Legislative identification and subsequent regulation of troubling police 
activity is not limited to conduct that physically harms victims. In response to 
the United States Supreme Court’s initial determination that the Fourth 
Amendment did not bar the police from wiretapping a suspect’s phone,65 Con-
gress passed legislation explicitly prohibiting wiretapping.66 In fact, Congress 
has proven relatively responsive to the criminal justice concerns of politically 
influential constituencies.67 In response to staunch advocacy by business and 
white-collar defense lawyers, Congress significantly weakened the govern-
ment’s ability to seize assets from criminal defendants under civil forfeiture 
laws.68 Congress also demonstrated a willingness to address the privacy con-
                                                                                                                           
 63 See Pub. L. 103-322, 108 Stat. 2071 (current version at 42 U.S.C § 14141 (2006)); see also 
Livingston, supra note 44, at 816 (describing the role that the Rodney King beating and the findings 
of the Christopher Commission, which investigated the L.A. Police after King’s assault, played in the 
adoption of § 14141). 
 64 See Leigh Goodmark, Law is the Answer? Do We Know That for Sure?: Questioning the Effi-
cacy of Legal Interventions for Battered Women, 23 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 7, 15 (2004) (“Advo-
cates soon began to press for another tool to ensure that batterers would be held accountable: manda-
tory arrest laws.”); David Michael Jaros, Unfettered Discretion: Criminal Orders of Protection and 
Their Impact on Parent Defendants, 85 IND. L.J. 1445, 1452 (2010) (describing how feminist activists 
successfully championed the adoption of domestic violence mandatory arrest laws cases that limited 
police discretion); G. Kristian Miccio, A House Divided: Mandatory Arrest, Domestic Violence, and 
the Conservatization of the Battered Women’s Movement, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 237, 277 (2005) (describ-
ing grassroots campaigns to enact mandatory arrest laws). 
 65 Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 456–57, 464 (1928). 
 66 See Communications Act of 1932, Pub. L. No. 73-416, § 605(a), 48 Stat. 1064, 1103–04 (codi-
fied as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 605 (2006)); see also Kerr, supra note 7, at 888 (describing the im-
portant role that legislative statutes have played in protecting privacy interests). 
Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, § 605, 48 Stat. 1064, 1103–04 (codified as amended at 47 
U.S.C. § 605 (2006)). 
 67 See Craig S. Lerner, Legislators as the “American Criminal Class”: Why Congress (Some-
times) Protects the Rights of Defendants, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 599, 618–20 (describing congressional 
responsiveness to business and the “white collar defense lobby” on a variety of criminal justice is-
sues); see also Dripps, supra note 62, at 1083 (explaining that when “law enforcement methods offend 
some powerful interest group, an interest group with enough influence to move the legislature to pro-
tect it from the police or the prosecutor” can spur legislatures to regulate law enforcement activities”); 
Stuntz, supra note 10, at 798 (noting that federal statutes regulating law enforcement activities “pro-
tect mostly (though not exclusively) middle—and upper-class suspects”). 
 68 See Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000, Pub. L. 106-85, 114 Stat 202. 
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cerns of middle and upper class voters by passing statutes that protect the con-
fidentiality of Internet communications69 and the privacy of bank records.70 
Perhaps the most conspicuous example of legislators’ willingness to examine 
and regulate police practices when it is in their political interest to do so is 
Congressional scrutiny of police practices that affects their own members.71 
Congress had demonstrated little interest in examining law enforcement’s use 
of undercover investigations and informants prior to the Abscam investigation, 
which revealed that several members of Congress were accepting bribes.72 Fol-
lowing the investigation, Congress held hearings and proposed legislation that 
would require the FBI to establish either “probable cause” or “reasonable sus-
picion” before agents could initiate an undercover investigation.73 
Yet although state legislatures tend to be sensitive to the concerns of polit-
ically powerful constituents, they are notoriously less responsive to the law 
enforcement concerns of citizens in poorer, less influential communities.74 Be-
cause legislatures are far less likely to investigate questionable police practices 
that are confined to those populations, the judiciary plays a key role in drawing 
attention to police activity that warrants regulation that the legislature has little 
political incentive to investigate. At the same time, because many law en-
forcement strategies do not directly implicate the trial process, the political 
process remains an important mechanism for identifying police practices that 
otherwise elude judicial scrutiny. 
                                                                                                                           
 69 See Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2701–2712 (2000); see also Lerrner, 
supra note 67, at 618–20 (white collar criminal defense bar lobbyists influenced passing of the Civil 
Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000). 
 70 Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401–3422 (2000). 
 71 See Lerner, supra note 67, at 602 (“[L]egislators have on several occasions confronted the 
possibility of criminal prosecutions, and this prospect has profoundly shaped the legislative develop-
ment of Anglo-American criminal procedure.”). 
 72 See generally Katherine Goldwasser, After Abscam: An Examination of Congressional Pro-
posals to Limit Targeting Discretion in Federal Undercover Investigations, 36 EMORY L.J. 75 (1987) 
(describing the Abscam investigation and the legislative responses to the scandal). 
 73 Id. at 93 (describing legislative proposals that would create a factual predicate standard that the 
FBI would have to satisfy before initiating an undercover investigation). 
 74 Andrew E. Taslitz, Fourth Amendment Federalism and the Silencing of the American Poor, 85 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 277, 283 (2010) (“Poor urban racial minorities face terrific challenges in being 
heard at all, but their voices are particularly muted before state and federal legislatures.”); see David 
Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice Scholar-
ship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1062 (1999) (“Reliance on the political process in [poor communities] will 
simply ensure that minority interests within inner-city communities will be ignored.”). But see Dan M. 
Kahan & Tracey L. Meares, The Coming Crisis of Criminal Procedure, 86 GEO. L.J. 1153, 1167 
(1998) (“African-American citizens are no longer excluded from the political process, and in fact 
exercise significant power in the nation’s inner-cities.”). 
1162 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1149 
B. Political Insulation and the Regulation of Law Enforcement 
The politics of crime are not particularly conducive to the vigorous regu-
lation of law enforcement.75 Some scholars have attributed politicians’ per-
ceived need to appear “tough on crime” to the “culture of fear” created by 
graphic depictions of crime in news and entertainment media.76 Others focus 
on broader social and economic shifts77 and even cognitive bias78 to explain 
the dominance of “law and order” politics.79 Whatever the explanation, it may 
well be that the political risks associated with promoting policies that constrain 
law enforcement are too great for elected officials to overcome easily.80 Alt-
hough, as discussed above, legislators demonstrate a willingness to identify 
and regulate police activity that implicates their own or other powerful constit-
uencies’ interests,81 they are generally reluctant to suffer the political costs of 
limiting police discretion in favor of criminal suspects’ privacy interests.82 
                                                                                                                           
 75 Dripps, supra note 62, at 1081 (“Public choice theory suggests that an overwhelming prepon-
derance of political incentives favor unrestricted enforcement of the criminal law, even if this means 
abusive police methods or convicting the innocent.”). 
 76 JONATHON SIMON, GOVERNING THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED 
AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A CULTURE OF FEAR 114, 208, 239 (2007) (suggesting that 
the media has created a public perception of extreme danger of criminal violence in many aspects of 
daily life); see Beale, supra note 12, at 47 (describing how media depictions of crime help to shape 
public attitudes and political agendas on the issue of crime). 
 77 See generally DAVID GARLAND, THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN 
CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY (2001) (explaining the shift in criminal justice policy as a societal response 
to social, economic, and cultural shifts as well as the political realignments that responded to these 
changes). 
 78 Beale, supra note 12, at 57–60 (suggesting that the psychology of cognition and risk assess-
ment may explain public support for “tough on crime” politics); Darryl K. Brown, Cost-Benefit Anal-
ysis in Criminal Law, 92 CAL. L. REV. 323, 342 (2004) (describing how cognitive bias can skew 
judgments about criminal law and policy). 
 79 See Harry A. Chernoff et. al., The Politics of Crime, 33 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 527, 532–33 
(1996) (tracing the politicization of the crime issue to Richard Nixon’s successful promotion of his 
“law and order” platform in 1968); David Michael Jaros, Flawed Coalitions and the Politics of Crime, 
99 IOWA L. REV. 1473, 1493 (2014) (describing the decline of the rehabilitative ideal and the increas-
ing political dominance of conservative law and order ideologies). But see Mary D. Fan, Beyond 
Budget-Cut Criminal Justice: The Future of Penal Law, 90 N.C. L. REV. 581, 640 (2012) (suggesting 
that fiscal concerns have begun to shift the political necessity of appearing “tough on crime” and poli-
ticians growing willingness to support less punitive reforms if they will save money). 
 80 Beale, supra note 12, at 29 (“In the United States, politicians have learned that to win you need 
to convince the public that you are tough on crime.”). 
 81 See supra notes 57–63 and accompanying text. 
 82 Dripps, supra note 62, at 1094 (“[It] is perfectly rational for legislators to perceive that there is 
considerable political risk, and very little return, to taking the side of the suspect.”); Joshua S. Levy, 
Towards A Brighter Fourth Amendment: Privacy and Technological Change, 16 VA. J.L. & TECH. 
502, 510 (2011) (“[L]egislatures face little or no political pressure to protect the rights of the criminal-
ly accused, but face strong political pressure to ensure crime control.”). 
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Similarly, courts are not wholly immune from political pressure to let the 
police do what it takes to fight crime.83 Elected judges are particularly moti-
vated to avoid unduly restricting law enforcement.84 Nonetheless, although the 
politics of crime complicates both branches’ efforts to strike a balance between 
the crime-fighting needs of the police and the privacy interests of the public, 
judges tend to be more politically insulated than their legislative counterparts. 
It may well be, however, that the political challenge of restraining the po-
lice is an asset—rather than a hindrance—to developing an effective approach 
to regulating law enforcement behavior. The legislature’s responsiveness to 
law enforcement needs may actually complement the more politically inde-
pendent judiciary’s efforts to balance citizen’s privacy interests against public 
safety demands. As discussed below, judicial decisions interpreting state stat-
utes that take into account the political dominance of law enforcement interests 
may best promote an informed public debate about law enforcement activities 
that have heretofore largely escaped legislative scrutiny. At the same time, leg-
islative sensitivity to the demands of pro-law enforcement constituencies can 
help to ensure that judicial interventions do not restrict critical police activities 
without allowing the legislature an opportunity to craft rules that adequately 
restrain the police without unduly limiting their crime fighting abilities. 
C. The Ability to Develop Effective Regulatory Regimes 
Identifying police conduct that warrants regulation and resisting the polit-
ical pressure to ignore it is, of course, only half the battle. In addition to calling 
attention to law enforcement strategies that implicate important privacy and 
liberty interests, effective regulation requires the formulation of rules or insti-
tutional mechanisms that adequately curtail undesirable police activity without 
excessively limiting law enforcement’s ability to protect the public. To suc-
cessfully craft policies that balance these competing concerns, the institutions 
tasked with “policing the police” must have access to ample information about 
law enforcement activities and the challenges that the police face, as well as 
the flexibility to adjust interventions that don’t function effectively. 
                                                                                                                           
 83 See Andrew E. Taslitz, Stories of Fourth Amendment Disrespect: From Elian to the Intern-
ment, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 2257, 2294–99 (2002) (describing the “saga of Judge Baer,” a U.S. Dis-
trict Court judge in New York who faced calls for impeachment as a result of a ruling suppressing 
evidence that he later retracted after what some considered “a successful assault on judicial independ-
ence”). 
 84 See Michael Tonry, Determinants of Penal Policies, 36 CRIME & JUST. 1, 35–36 (2007) (de-
scribing how the impartiality and independence of elected judges is threatened by the political risks 
associated with making unpopular decisions in cases that are notorious or involve controversial poli-
cies); cf. Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan, Judges and the Politics of Death: Deciding Between 
the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. Rev. 759, 798–99 (1995) (elected 
judges face political pressure in death penalty and habeas corpus cases). 
1164 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 55:1149 
Amassing data about police activities, the concerns of constituents, and 
the opportunities and threats of new technology may be the first step in devel-
oping tools to regulate the police effectively, but few regulatory efforts are per-
fected in the first attempt. One asserted advantage that legislatures have over 
courts when it comes to regulating the police is their ability to amend regulato-
ry regimes that are ineffective or produce undesirable results.85 Courts certain-
ly can revisit doctrinal prescriptions,86 but both the facts of the specific cases 
before the court and the inflexible demands of stare decisis limit courts’ discre-
tion.87 The “everlasting aye or nay of constitutional decision,” although not 
entirely eternal, cannot be easily modified.88 Indeed, the very inflexibility of 
constitutional pronouncements may explain courts’ reluctance to find constitu-
tional limits to police activity.89 Legislators’ ability to amend the statutory 
schemes they develop not only allows them to perfect the rules they impose, 
but also lowers the risks of intervening in the first place. 
Thus, each branch of government possesses advantages towards effective-
ly regulating law enforcement. Although courts are adept at identifying prob-
lematic police activity that directly impacts the trial process, legislatures are 
attuned to the demands of their constituents and the media. Similarly, although 
legislatures can easily gather information and can revisit statutory schemes to 
improve their effectiveness, courts enjoy a substantial degree of political insu-
lation that may be a prerequisite to developing policies that constrain law en-
forcement. The ideal regime for regulating police conduct, therefore, is one 
which utilizes both branches and allows for the strengths of one to compensate 
for the weaknesses of the other. By adopting a robust preemption doctrine, 
courts may be able to overcome legislatures’ reluctance to investigate and de-
bate suspect police practices, but also leave elected officials the opportunity to 
evaluate the problem and propose and amend their own solutions. 
                                                                                                                           
 85 Kerr, supra note 7, at 871 (noting that courts lack a legislature’s abilities to experiment and 
frequently amend, to restrict both public and private actors, and to “sunset” rules after a certain 
amount of time.)  
 86 See, e.g., Robert M. Pitler, The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CAL. 
L. REV. 579 (1968) (discussing the evolution of the “fruit of the poisonous tree” doctrine); Solove, 
supra note 2, at 762 (identifying court decisions finding exceptions to the warrant and probable cause 
requirements). 
 87 Kerr, supra note 7, at 871 (arguing that stare decisis and the need to resolve the specific deci-
sions that come in front of them, limit courts’ ability to develop flexibility rules to protect privacy); 
Margaret H. Lemos, The Consequences of Congress’s Choice of Delegate: Judicial and Agency Inter-
pretations of Title VII, 63 VAND. L. REV. 363, 379 (2010) (noting that judicial decision-making tends 
to be more rigid than agency decision-making because of stare decisis). 
 88 Friendly, supra note 9, at 930. 
 89 The inflexibility of constitutional rules also means that courts set the actual limits of police 
behavior rather than identify a standard for how law enforcement should behave. See Harmon, supra 
note 1, at 776–77 (explaining that, because constitutional criminal procedure rights set “unbreakable 
rules,” they must be more generous to law enforcement than to the privacy interests at state). 
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II. INTRASTATE PREEMPTION AND THE POLICE 
Despite their different strengths and the important roles that both institu-
tions have played in curtailing undesirable police conduct, judicial and legisla-
tive efforts to regulate the police have historically been uncoordinated and 
even detrimental to each other.90 Rather than compensate for the political chal-
lenges that deter legislators from actively regulating police activity, the judici-
ary has arguably adopted baseline protections which have excused further leg-
islative action without adequately limiting undesirable police conduct.91 The 
judiciary has likewise failed to expose many police practices that legislators 
have ignored but that warrant greater democratic scrutiny. Finally, although 
legislatures have proven themselves willing to intercede to protect powerful 
political constituencies from undesirable police intrusion,92 they have been 
unwilling to investigate and restrict police practices that affect less politically 
powerful groups.93 
The criticism typically leveled at judicial efforts to regulate the police is 
that they are antidemocratic, ineffective, and likely to justify inaction by defer-
ring to the other branches of government.94 The judiciary nonetheless has the 
potential to improve the effectiveness of police regulation without undermin-
ing democratic values. By adopting a robust preemption doctrine, the judiciary 
can force hidden police practices into the public debate and compel legislators 
to engage in the task of investigating and regulating undesirable police activity. 
Rather than inhibit policy experimentation, such an approach will engender 
public deliberation about unexamined police practices without cutting off ex-
perimentation with rigid constitutional limits on policing practices. 
                                                                                                                           
 90 See Luna, supra note 21, at 1114 (describing the failure of courts or legislatures to curb police 
misconduct); Stuntz, supra note 10, at 849–50 (illustrating the conflicts in the policies of the Supreme 
Court and politicians). 
 91 See Stuntz, supra note 10, at 794 (“Constitutional regulation raises the political price of legisla-
tive regulation.”). 
 92 See supra notes 67–73 and accompanying text. 
 93 See supra note 74 and accompanying text. 
 94 See Lino A. Graglia, In Defense of Federalism, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 23, 28 (1982) (de-
scribing the court’s criminal procedure jurisprudence as “totally undemocratic”); Rachel A. Harmon, 
Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Policing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3 (2009) (“[T]he 
traditional federal legal means of regulating police officer conduct—federal criminal prosecutions, 
civil suits for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the exclusionary rule—do not spur widespread 
change in the pathological police departments.”); Fred E. Inbau, More About Public Safety v. Individ-
ual Civil Liberties, 53 J. CRIM L., CRIMINOLOGY & POLICE SCI. 329, 329–30 (1962) (criticizing the 
Supreme Court’s Mapp decision for overriding Michigan’s democratically derived solution to illegal 
searches); Stuntz, supra note 10, at 851 (arguing that the constitutionalization of criminal procedure 
encourages politicians to undermine civil liberty interests and “risks stifling experiment and innova-
tion in America’s criminal justice system”). 
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A. The Intrastate Preemption Doctrine 
“Intrastate preemption” occurs when state law precludes local governments 
from exercising their authority in a particular field.95 The doctrine of intrastate 
preemption is often accused of stifling municipal policy innovation by allowing 
powerful business and industry groups to obstruct local democratic efforts to 
protect important community interests such as the environment and public 
health.96 In fact, the doctrine has decidedly different consequences depending 
upon the political strength of the parties involved.97 When the doctrine is applied 
to statutes implicating police conduct, it may actually promote a policy debate 
that engages both legislators and the electorate in evaluating police activity that 
would otherwise escape scrutiny. 
Intrastate preemption operates much like federal preemption.98 State law 
can preempt a local ordinance in one of two ways. Express preemption occurs 
when a state statute explicitly bars local lawmaking in a particular field.99 Al-
ternatively, implied preemption occurs when a statute fails to provide clear 
guidance as to what it allows, and a judge concludes that the legislature had 
intended to bar local lawmaking.100 Although the semantics and details of in-
dividual state approaches vary, in general, courts will find that a state statute 
impliedly preempts local action when either the local policy “conflicts” with 
the state law by frustrating the state law’s objectives101 or the legislature has so 
                                                                                                                           
 95 See Diller, supra note 18, at 1116 (describing the doctrine of state preemption and its impact on 
local policy innovation); see also Weiland, supra note 18. 
 96 See supra notes 18–20 and accompanying text. 
 97 See infra notes 123–129 and accompanying text. 
 98 Diller, supra note 18, at 1140 (“Despite some superficial distinctions, most states’ preemption 
analyses are similar in form to the federal model.”). 
 99 See Goodell v. Humboldt Cnty., 575 N.W.2d 486, 492 (Iowa 1998) (“Express preemption occurs 
when the general assembly has specifically prohibited local action in an area.”); Diller, supra note 18, at 
1115 (“When a state legislature explicitly declares that local laws are preempted within a certain field—
so-called ‘express preemption’—the courts’ task is relatively simple: to determine whether the chal-
lenged ordinance falls within the subject matter that the legislature expressly preempted.”). 
 100 Diller, supra note 18, at 1116–17 (“But when the state legislature has given no clear guidance 
regarding preemption, state courts ask whether local authority has nonetheless been impliedly 
preempted.”). Every state, with the exception of Illinois, embraces some form of implied preemption. 
Id. at 1141 (“Nonetheless, all but one state—Illinois—embraces some form of implied preemption.”); 
cf. ILL. CONST. art. VII, § 6(i) (“Home rule units may exercise and perform concurrently with the 
State any power or function of a home rule unit to the extent that the General Assembly by law does 
not specifically limit the concurrent exercise or specifically declare the State’s exercise to be exclu-
sive.”). 
 101 See, e.g., Hill v. Tschannen, 590 S.E.2d 133, 135 (Ga. Ct. App. 2003) (ruling that a local fire 
ordinance was impliedly preempted by state statute regulating smoke detectors because the local ordi-
nance would “hinder the operation of the state law”). 
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fully regulated the legal area in question that the court can infer that the legis-
lature intended to “occupy the entire field.”102 
There are some critical differences between federal preemption and intra-
state preemption. At the federal level, the Supremacy Clause, which empowers 
Congress to preempt state law103 is counterbalanced by the Tenth Amendment, 
which reserves non-enumerated powers to the states.104 Conversely, at the state 
level the presumption is essentially reversed—the powers of local governments 
are limited to what has been delegated to them either by statute or by the state 
constitution.105 As a result, although federalism concerns might militate against 
the application of the preemption doctrine, the structural relationship between 
state government and local municipalities is more conducive to a judicial poli-
cy favoring preemption. 
Importantly, the flow of authority from the state to local governments ap-
plies to municipal employees as well.106 As a result, “the actions of law en-
forcement officers, like all other government actors’ actions, must be traceable 
to some grant of authority from a politically accountable body.”107 
This is not to suggest that local governments (and their employees) are 
powerless. In the late nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, courts 
followed “Dillon’s Rule,”108 which provides that state delegation of power to 
local municipalities should be interpreted narrowly with a general presumption 
that municipal corporations lack the ability to act when there was any doubt as 
                                                                                                                           
 102 See, e.g., City of Northglenn v. Ibarra, 62 P.3d 151, 163 (Colo. 2003) (holding that state stat-
utes regulating juvenile homes were so complete and pervasive that they implied the Colorado Gen-
eral Assembly’s intent to “occupy the field”). 
 103 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States . . . shall be 
the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the 
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
 104 U.S. CONST. amend. X (“The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, 
nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”) 
 105 See, e.g., City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923) (“In the absence of state 
constitutional provisions safeguarding it to them, municipalities have no inherent right of self-
government which is beyond the legislative control of the state.”); Hunter v. City of Pittsburgh, 207 
U.S. 161, 178 (1907) (“Municipal corporations are political subdivisions of the state, created as con-
venient agencies for exercising such of the governmental powers of the state as may be entrusted to 
them.”); Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I—The Structure of Local Government Law, 90 COL-
UM. L. REV. 1, 7 (1990) (“As a matter of conventional legal theory, the states enjoy complete hegem-
ony over local governments”). 
 106 Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1062 (1980) (“Under 
current law, cities have no ‘natural’ or ‘inherent’ power to do anything simply because they decide to 
do it.”); see 2A EUGENE MCQUILLIN, THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 10:3 (3d ed. 1996 
& Supp. 1999) (“[M]unicipalities have no inherent powers and possess only such powers as are ex-
pressly conferred by statute or implied as necessary in aid of those powers which have been expressly 
conferred.”). 
 107 State v. Backstrand, 313 P.3d 1084, 1111 (Or. 2013); see State v. Bridewell, 759 P.2d 1054, 
1059 (Or. 1988) (“Whether law enforcement officers have specific functions is a matter of statutory 
law.”). 
 108 See JOHN F. DILLON, TREATISE ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 102 (1872). 
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to their authority.109 Gradually, however, Dillon’s rule gave way to the “home 
rule movement,” which endowed local governments with considerably more 
legislative power.110 
Initially, home rule provisions followed the imperium in imperio doctrine, 
which granted municipalities the power to regulate matters that were of solely 
local concern.111 Advocates who favored broader local authority nonetheless 
expressed frustration with court decisions that narrowly interpreted what was 
“local” and that “generally reflected either hostility toward home rule or undue 
deference to legislative intervention.”112 As a result, civic organizations like 
the American Municipal Association proposed a new approach to home rule 
that would strengthen local governments’ ability to establish policy.113 The new 
formulation of home rule became known as “legislative home rule,” because it 
sought to shift the authority to determine what constituted a “local matter” 
from the courts to the state legislature.114 
By 1990, 48 states had adopted some form of home rule for at least some 
of their cities. Although each state has evolved its own unique balance of state 
and local power, state legislatures have largely retained the ability to withdraw 
the authority that has been endowed to municipal governments for all but the 
most local concerns.115 For those states that adopted legislative home rule, the 
state legislature has almost unlimited authority to preempt local government 
action.116 For these states there is little question that state law bars any munici-
pal police activity that either frustrates a state law’s objectives or that would 
                                                                                                                           
 109 See id. (“Any fair, reasonable doubt concerning the existence of power is resolved by the 
courts against the corporation and the power is denied.”). 
 110 See Briffault, supra note 105, at 7–11 (describing the shift from Dillon’s Rule to home rule). 
 111 See Kenneth Vanlandingham, Constitutional Municipal Home Rule Since the AMA (NLC) 
Model, 17 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1, 1–2 (1975). 
 112 See City of New Orleans v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 640 So. 2d 237, 242 (La. 1994) (describing the 
origins of legislative home rule). 
 113 See RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW 332 
(7th ed. 2009) (describing the evolution of home rule); see also Richard Briffault, Home Rule and 
Local Political Innovation, 22 J.L. & POL’Y 1, 28 (2006) (“The rise of the legislative home rule mod-
el—which trades away all immunity in order to assure greater scope to local initiative—is surely at 
least in part attributable to the sense that local governments usually lose when balancing is the rule.”). 
 114 See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 113, at 333–34;. By 1990, 48 states had adopted 
some form of home rule for at least some of their cities. Id. at 317. It is worth noting that many state 
home rule provisions combine imperio in imperium language with the home rule language suggested 
by the American Municipal Association. As a result, scholars’ estimates of the number of states with 
home rule charters do differ. See Diller, supra note 18, at 1127 n.65. 
 115 Diller, supra note 18, at 1127 (explaining that, despite the differing approaches to local au-
thority across the states, preemption remains “the primary battleground for determining the parameters 
of local authority”). 
 116 See Laurie Reynolds, Home Rule, Extraterritorial Impact, and the Region, 86 DENV. U.L. 
REV. 1271, 1276 (2009) (“[L]egislative home rule contemplates a much reduced judicial role, with the 
determination of the scope of home rule power left almost entirely in the hands of the legislature.”); 
Vanlandingham, supra note 111, at 6. 
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supplement state policies in an area where the state legislature has intended to 
“occupy the field.”117 
 Even in states that have adopted the imperio home rule model, which 
purports to reserve authority over local matters to municipal governments,118 
courts have held that state law nonetheless preempts municipal law in matters 
that are of “mixed local and state concern.”119 When police activity implicates 
both local and statewide interests, there is little question that local authority to 
act can be preempted by state law even in municipalities with imperio home 
rule.120 Thus, although municipalities have considerable delegated power to 
maintain public safety, state governments generally remain the ultimate author-
ity over issues related to law enforcement and crime suppression.121 To the ex-
tent that a police activity implicates only local interests, however, judges may 
be reluctant to hold that state law preempts local law enforcement’s authority. 
B. Preemption, Innovation, and the Promotion of Democratic  
Engagement in Policing Policy 
Some scholars criticize judges’ “overzealous” application of implied 
preemption claiming that such decisions thwart local governments’ develop-
ment of new, innovative policies.122 Local efforts to promote gay rights,123 en-
                                                                                                                           
 117 See, e.g., Mall Real Estate, L.L.C. v. City of Hamburg, 818 N.W.2d 190, 195 (Iowa 2012) 
(“[U]nder legislative home rule, the legislature retains the unfettered power to prohibit a municipality 
for exercising police powers, even over matters traditionally thought to involve local affairs.”) (quot-
ing City of Davenport v. Seymour, 755 N.W.2d 533, 538 (Iowa 2008)). 
 118 In practice, courts have closely circumscribed the authority of imperio home rule municipali-
ties by narrowly interpreting what constitutes a “local” concern. See Diller, supra note 18, at 1125. 
 119 See City of Commerce City v. State, 40 P.3d 1273, 1279 (Colo. 2002) (“[I]f a home-rule ordi-
nance or charter conflicts with a state statute in a matter of mixed concern, the state statute supersedes 
the home-rule provision.”); see also Frug, supra note 106, at 1062–63 (“[M]ost state constitutions 
have been amended to grant cities ‘home rule,’ but local self-determination free of state control is still 
limited even in those jurisdictions to matters ‘purely local’ in nature.”). 
 120 Axberg v. City of Lincoln, 2 N.W.2d 613, 615 (Neb. 1942) (matters regarding fire, police, and 
health departments are matters of state-wide concern subject to preemption regardless of home rule). 
 121 See Van Gilder v. City of Madison, 267 N.W. 25, 32 (Wis. 1936) (“[E]nforcement of the law, 
the preservation of order, the protection of persons and property and the suppression of crime must 
always be matters of state-wide concern . . . because for a long time these duties have been delegated 
to and performed by the various municipal subdivisions of the state, these functions are ordinarily 
thought of as being in part the primary duties of cities and other municipalities. However, it would be 
within the competency of the Legislature if it so desired to entirely rearrange the law of the state with 
respect to these matters.”). 
 122 See Diller, supra note 18, at 1114 (“[T]he primary threat to local innovation is the charge of 
intrastate preemption . . . .”); Parlow, supra note 19, at 372 (“[L]ocal governments’ powers have been 
drastically limited by a perhaps overzealous preemption doctrine which may run afoul of the original 
intent of the home rule movement in state and local government law.”). 
 123 See, e.g., Lilly v. City of Minneapolis, 527 N.W.2d 107, 113 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (holding 
the City of Minneapolis’s extension of insurance benefits to domestic partners to be in conflict with an 
area the state had sought to occupy exclusively and therefore preempted by state law). But see, e.g., 
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 336 F.3d 1174, 1180 (9th Cir. 2003) (determin-
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sure that workers earn a living wage,124 protect the environment,125 and pro-
mote public health,126 have been stymied by opponents’ lawsuits arguing that 
state law impliedly preempted the local enactment of such polices.127 Support-
ers of greater autonomy for local governments often argue that state courts’ use 
of implied preemption to block local policy efforts not only undermines the 
potential for local governments to serve as “laboratories of innovation,”128 it 
also allows powerful political parties to undermine participatory democracy 
and weaken civic engagement.129 
Such attacks on preemption may often be warranted. Lawsuits asserting 
implied preemption can obstruct innovative responses to pressing social con-
cerns that advocates have been unable to implement at the state or federal lev-
el.130 Local efforts can be particularly valuable because they can spark 
statewide—and even national—debates and serve to incubate new approaches 
to seemingly intractable political and social problems.131 Indeed, at least one 
                                                                                                                           
ing that San Francisco’s prohibiting city agencies from contracting with businesses that discriminate 
on the basis of sexual orientation does not conflict with the California law on domestic partnerships 
and therefore is not subject to preemption). 
 124 See New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans, 825 So. 2d 1098, 1108 
(La. 2002) (concluding that Louisiana state law preempted New Orleans’s minimum wage law). 
 125 See, e.g., Envirosafe Servs. of Idaho, Inc. v. Owyhee Cnty., 735 P.2d 998, 1004 (Idaho 1987) 
(determining that Owyhee County’s effort to regulate the disposal of hazardous waste was impliedly 
preempted by state law); Town of Wendell v. Attorney General, 476 N.E.2d 585, 592 (Mass. 1985) 
(holding that the town’s by-law limiting the use of pesticides was preempted by the state’s Pesticide 
Control Act). 
 126 Allied Vending, Inc. v. City of Bowie, 631 A.2d 77, 92 (Md. 1993) (ruling that the state legis-
lature “manifested an intent for the State to completely occupy the field of the sale of cigarettes 
through vending machines rendering any local or municipal ordinances . . . constitutionally invalid”). 
 127 See Parlow, supra note 19, at 375–76. 
 128 Id. at 384 (“However, the narrow construction of home rule powers, coupled with the frequen-
cy with which implied preemption is used by state courts to invalidate local laws, raises questions as 
to whether we are foreclosing a significant opportunity to use local governments as the forums for 
experimentation as Justice Brandeis once envisioned of the states.”) (citing New State Ice Co. v. 
Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis J. dissenting) (“It is one of the happy incidents of the 
federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens choose, serve as a laboratory; and try 
novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.”)). 
 129 Catherine L. Fisk & Michael M. Oswalt, Preemption and Civic Democracy in the Battle over 
Wal-Mart, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1502, 1525 (2008) (“Preemption disempowers local government, and 
with that loss of power goes loss of a reason for citizens to participate in civic life.”). 
 130 Parlow, supra note 19, at 375 (“In many ways, local governments have led the way in many 
areas of public policy where the federal and state governments have either failed, avoided issues alto-
gether, or been unable to reach an agreement because of the divergent interests of their constituen-
cies.”). 
 131 David J. Barron, The Promise of Cooley’s City: Traces of Local Constitutionalism, 147 U. PA. 
L. REV. 487, 490 (1999) (“[O]ur towns and cities are what we know them to be: important political 
institutions that are directly responsible for shaping the contours of ‘ordinary civic life in a free socie-
ty.’” (quoting Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 631 (1996))); Briffault, supra note 113, at 31 (describ-
ing the potential for local governments to serve as “laboratories of public policy formation” and “pro-
vide thousands of arenas for innovation and for testing the costs and benefits of those innovations”). 
2014] Preempting the Police 1171 
scholar suggested that towns and cities play such a critical role in developing 
policies that they “give content to substantive constitutional principles,” and 
the Federal Constitution should be interpreted to protect them from state or 
federal interference.132 
The claim that preemption undermines civic engagement in favor of spe-
cial interests that have too much clout at the state and national level is also 
born out in many instances. Powerful business and industry interests often re-
sist local laws that threaten to impose additional financial burdens on them by 
asserting that state law precludes local governments from regulating their ac-
tivities.133 When the citizens of New Orleans passed a living wage ordinance 
that raised the minimum wage for employees working in the city, well-funded 
business groups filed suit and successfully argued that state law preempted the 
city’s ordinance.134 Although the living wage ordinance enjoyed popular sup-
port at the local level, business interests possessed greater influence at the state 
level where they proactively persuaded the state legislature to pass a blanket 
prohibition barring local governments from establishing a minimum rate.135 
Powerful business interests have routinely asserted preemption arguments to 
block popular local democratic initiatives from laws that restrict access to ciga-
rette vending machines136 to efforts to regulate the dumping of hazardous 
waste.137 
On its face, therefore, preemption might appear to unduly restrict policy 
experimentation, undermine participatory democracy and diminish citizens’ 
incentive to participate in public life.138 Such criticism, although valid in many 
circumstances, rests on two critical presumptions: first, that interest groups 
lacking in political clout at the state (or national) level favor the local policy; 
and second, that the local polity has been actively engaged in shaping the poli-
cy being preempted. When, as in the case of policies governing policing, the 
proponents of the policy are politically powerful at higher levels of govern-
                                                                                                                           
 132 Barron, supra note 131 at 491 (“It is necessary to inquire, therefore, whether the Federal Con-
stitution may be understood to protect local governments from state attempts to prevent local govern-
ments from bringing their special institutional capacities to bear in these constitutional contexts.”). 
 133 Diller, supra note 18, at 1114 (“Business and industry groups are the litigants who most com-
monly assert preemption to block local policies that may impose additional costs and regulatory bur-
dens.”). 
 134 See Laura Gavioli, New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage v. City of New Orleans: State 
Police Power Swallows Up Constitutional Home Rule in Louisiana, 77 TUL. L. REV. 1129, 1129 
(2003). 
 135 See New Orleans Campaign for a Living Wage, 825 So. 2d at 1100; Gavioli, supra note 134, 
at 1129. 
 136 Allied Vending, 631 A.2d at 78. 
 137 See Goodell, 575 N.W.2d at 489 (ruling that local ordinances regulating toxic air emissions 
and instituting groundwater protection policies were invalid because they addressed a matter of 
statewide concern and because the county’s authority has been preempted by the Iowa legislature). 
 138 See supra note 124 and accompanying text. 
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ment and local citizens possess little voice in the formation of the local rule or 
practice, implied preemption may actually promote greater civic engagement 
and strengthen policy innovation. 
In his seminal article, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, Pro-
fessor Einer Elhauge recognized that judicial determinations of statutory con-
struction do not occur in a political vacuum.139 Rather, judges interpret statutes 
with the knowledge that their decisions can prompt the legislature to correct 
interpretations that contradict the legislature’s original intention.140 As a result, 
Professor Elhauge reasoned, when faced with uncertain statutes, judges can 
“serve as honest agents for a democratic polity” by interpreting statutes in 
ways that favor the politically powerless, trusting that influential interests can 
successfully lobby the legislature if the judges get it wrong.141 
In cases involving local ordinances implicating business interests, Profes-
sor Elhauge’s reasoning favors a weak preemption doctrine.142 In such cases, it 
is reasonable to expect that influential business groups will be able to seek re-
dress from the state legislature if a court erred in rejecting their preemption 
claims. Indeed, Professor Roderick Hills contended that courts should resist 
arguments in favor of federal preemption of state law precisely because influ-
ential business groups opposing state regulation are well equipped to lobby 
Congress for legislation clarifying the limits of states’ regulatory authority.143 
Notably, Professor Hills’s argument does not rest solely on the proposition that 
an anti-preemption default rule is likely to maximize the chance that the legis-
lation’s original intention is realized.144 A critical benefit of favoring the politi-
cally less influential position is that a court’s refusal to preempt state laws reg-
ulating powerful interests groups will “promote vigorous debate.”145 
                                                                                                                           
 139 See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Eliciting Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2162, 
2165 (2002). 
 140 See id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 See Diller, supra note 18, at 1149 (applying Elhauge’s default rule analysis to intrastate 
preemption issues). 
 143 Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Against Preemption: How Federalism Can Improve the National Legis-
lative Process, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (2007) (“By analogy, I argue that, where a statute is ambigu-
ous, a court ought to interpret the preemptive force of federal statutes to burden interest groups favor-
ing preemption, on the assumption that these pro-preemption groups are more capable of promoting a 
vigorous debate in Congress than their opponents.”). 
 144 See id. Unlike Professor Hills, Professor Elhauge advocated for the adoption of canons of 
construction that favor the politically powerless on the grounds that this strategy was the one most 
likely to result in the outcome the legislature originally intended. Compare Elhauge, supra note 139, 
at 2165–66 (suggesting that statutory default rules disfavoring powerful interest groups will “maxim-
ize the accurate measurement of political preferences”), with Hills, supra note 143, at 17 n.54 (“I am 
more interested in the quality of the congressional debate rather than the outcome of congressional 
votes . . . .”). 
 145 Hills, supra note 143, at 28. 
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Although Professor Hills’s intuition that “interests favoring preemption 
are best suited for promoting an open and vigorous debate on the floor of Con-
gress” may be valid in cases involving state and local regulations that effect 
industrial and business interests, as discussed above, the parties who are sub-
jected to controversial police practices are ill-equipped to seek legislative in-
tervention.146 Poor urban minority communities, which experience a dispropor-
tionate share of police activity and are more likely to encounter questionable 
police practices,147 often have little political influence and lack the means to 
press legislators to openly debate issues.148 Moreover, citizens tend not to fore-
see themselves as the subjects of future police investigations and, consequent-
ly, are unlikely to push their legislators to examine questionable policing 
methods ex ante.149 Finally, some policing practices may not be disclosed to 
the general public. As a result, there may be times when the only constituency 
that is fully informed of a dubious police practice is the group of defendants 
alerted to its existence in the course of their own arrest and prosecution. Given 
the politics of crime at both the state and national level, it is hardly surprising 
that legislators are not particularly responsive to the interests of criminal de-
fendants.150 As a result, the legislature may never investigate or even consider 
                                                                                                                           
 146 See Darryl K. Brown, Democracy and Decriminalization, 86 TEX. L. REV. 223, 233 (2007) 
(“Rarely does an interest group of significant influence emerge to counter the influence of prosecutors 
. . . .”); Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Grieving Criminal Defense Lawyers, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 
1615, 1618 (2002) (“[C]riminal defendants have no powerful lobby at either the state or federal lev-
el.”); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 
YALE L.J. 331, 362 (1991) (explaining that “state and federal law enforcement officials are powerful 
interests that can command congressional attention, while criminal defendants and suspects are more 
diffuse, marginalized, and less sympathetic groups”); Hill, supra note 143, at 28. 
 147 Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence Conception 
of Deterence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York Style, 97 
MICH. L. REV. 291, 382 (1998) (“The point is that more blacks are arrested for misdemeanors than 
whites given their proportion in the overall population. The decision to arrest misdemeanants—rather 
than not arrest them—is a policy that has a disparate impact on minorities.”); Cynthia Lee, Package 
Bombs, Footlockers, and Laptops: What the Disappearing Container Doctrine Can Tell Us About the 
Fourth Amendment, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1403, 1473 (2010) (“[P]olice tend to focus their 
crime-fighting activities in poor urban neighborhoods . . . .”); Taslitz, supra note 74, at 282 (explain-
ing that the police are more likely to conduct surveillance in poor urban neighborhoods populated by 
racial minorities). 
 148 See supra note 73 and accompanying text. 
 149 Lerner, supra note 67, at 643 (“Those of us constituting the (blandly law-abiding) middle class 
are more apt to see ourselves as the victims of crime than as the perpetrators; and few of us, I suspect, 
lie awake at night, fearful that the executive branch will trouble to persecute us.”); see Dripps, supra 
note 62, at 1089 (“I suggest that legislators undervalue the rights of the accused for no more sinister, 
and no more tractable a cause than that a far larger number of persons, of much greater political influ-
ence, rationally adopt the perspective of a potential crime victim rather than the perspective of a sus-
pect or defendant.”). 
 150 Paul A. Diller, The Partly Fulfilled Promise of Home Rule in Oregon, 87 OR. L. REV. 939, 
950–51 (2008) (“Criminal defendants, on the other hand, are likely to constitute a weaker interest 
group as compared to cities, at least when the defendants are, as in most cases, a motley collection of 
individuals rather than corporations or wealthy, white-collar criminals.”); Elhauge, supra note 139, at 
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prevailing police practices that, if properly debated, might lack popular sup-
port. 
Conversely, the law enforcement community has considerable sway at the 
state (and national) level, and can spur legislative debate over police practices 
if courts hold that certain practices are preempted by state law.151 Rather than 
cut off democratic debate, an accusation often leveled at courts that recognize 
constitutional limits to police activity,152 a finding of preemption can engender 
exactly the kind of democratic dialogue that is lacking when it comes to police 
practices.153 
There is also little reason to believe that the majority of police practices 
evolved out of a democratic process that is entitled to a presumption of legiti-
macy. Although many preemption challenges to local authority emerge from 
business interests trying to counter democratically initiated regulatory efforts, 
police practices generally develop without community participation and often 
with little or no notice to the local population.154 Not only are formal police 
procedures developed internally without significant community input, many 
dubious police practices are developed informally and are entirely insulated 
from public debate.155 Court decisions preempting the police thus do not frus-
trate local democratic efforts or deter civic engagement. On the contrary, they 
can stimulate a debate over practices that might otherwise never receive demo-
cratic scrutiny. 
There is some irony to the claim that dubious police conduct should be 
presumptively preempted and disallowed by state law, given that state gov-
                                                                                                                           
2193 (“Most legislatures and their polities are hostile to criminal defendants.”); Michael J. Klarman, 
The Puzzling Resistance to Political Process Theory, 77 VA. L. REV. 747, 766 (1991) (finding that 
“the political process does not adequately represent the interests of those societal groups largely popu-
lating the criminal class”). 
 151 See Dripps, supra note 62, at 1091 (describing the political strength of police and prosecutors 
and how they “devote substantial effort to persuading legislators not to impose statutory restraints on 
[them]”); see also Rachel E. Barkow, Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 728 (2005) 
(“[O]ne of the most—if not the most—powerful lobbying groups in criminal law consists of those 
charged with exercising the penal power: law enforcement and, in particular, prosecutors.”); Stuntz, 
supra note 13, at 534 (explaining that prosecutors and the police are “a very powerful lobby on crimi-
nal law issues”) 
 152 See Inbau, supra note 94, at 330 (describing how the Court’s criminal procedure decisions cut 
off democratic efforts to develop solutions to difficult law enforcement issues); see also Graglia, su-
pra note 94, at 28 (criticizing Supreme Court lawmaking in a number of areas, including criminal 
procedure, for being “totally undemocratic”). 
 153 See Luna, supra note 21, at 1108 (“Nowhere is the conflict among democracy, liberty, and 
discretion more evident, and the need for openness more urgent, than in the execution of the penal 
code.”). 
 154 Id. at 1111 (detailing the “dark side of discretionary authority” not authorized by statute nor 
consistent with constitutional precedents”). 
 155 Id. at 1146 (describing hidden police practices). 
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ernment is notoriously unwilling to limit police authority.156 Indeed, this is 
precisely why a presumption in favor of preemption is likely to elicit a public 
debate over questionable police practices. Professor Einer Elhauge argued that 
the use of the rule of lenity, which requires “ambiguous criminal laws to be 
interpreted in favor of the defendants,”157 is best understood as an effort by 
judges to elicit clarifying laws from the legislature rather than as a default rule 
that implausibly assumes that legislators generally prefer to limit criminal lia-
bility.158 Similarly, the application of a robust preemption doctrine to judicial 
review of questionable police practices can be justified by the very fact that the 
legislature is more responsive to law enforcement concerns than the interests 
of those subject to police activity.159 
The relative political strength of the law enforcement lobby is not the on-
ly reason that a presumption in favor of intrastate preemption is likely to result 
in a more public and active debate over policing practices. Although local leg-
islators tend to be more responsive to community pressure to regulate the po-
lice than their state counterparts,160 local citizens groups will not always coa-
lesce to voice opposition to a questionable police practice. Instances of egre-
gious (and clearly illegal) police misconduct, like the infamous physical as-
saults on Rodney King and Abner Louima respectively, have given rise to ef-
fective grassroots campaigns.161 Other questionable police practices, however, 
may not engender sufficient local opposition to elicit a local debate over the 
                                                                                                                           
 156 See Dripps, supra note 62, at 1091 (“If broad police powers and pro-government trial proce-
dures had no beneficiaries, legislatures might be motivated to protect the rights of the accused. But 
there are beneficiaries, and they wield far more clout than the likely losers.”). 
 157 See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008). 
 158 See Elhauge, supra note 139, at 2193 (“[I]f one had to make an educated estimate (and given 
the premise of ambiguity, one must), one might perhaps even conclude that in ambiguous cases the 
legislature would likely prefer a ‘rule of severity’ . . . . It seems highly unlikely that any legislature is 
likely to prefer the weakest possible punishment.”); see also Santos, 553 U.S. at 514 (“[The rule of 
lenity] also places the weight of inertia upon the party that can best induce Congress to speak more 
clearly and keeps courts from making criminal law in Congress’s stead.”). 
 159 See Kerr, supra note 7, at 885 (“It is true that law enforcement groups will often lobby for 
greater powers. It is also true that law enforcement interests often prove highly influential among 
legislators.”); see also Murphy, supra note 12, at 535 (“[L]aw enforcement has a clear and constant 
voice in the political process, whereas the interests of privacy tend to be represented by groups inter-
ested less in privacy vis-à-vis policing (and the poor that make up the vast majority of criminal de-
fendants) than privacy as experienced by the middle and upper classes.”). 
 160 Taslitz, supra note 74, at 291 (“Local legislators may be limited in what they can do, but they 
find it impossible to ignore entirely the constant local public pressure for action to regulate the police 
and to improve the problems of crime and the criminal justice system.”). 
 161 See Susan Bandes, Patterns of Injustice: Police Brutality in the Courts, 47 BUFF. L. REV. 
1275, 1283 (1999) (crediting public outcry after Rodney King beating as a factor in uncovering sys-
tematic police brutality in the Los Angeles Police Department); Jennifer E. Koepke, The Failure to 
Breach the Blue Wall of Silence: The Circling of the Wagons to Protect Police Perjury, 39 WASH-
BURN L.J. 211, 213–15 (2000) (linking public response to the Abner Louima case to increased media 
coverage of subsequent police brutality cases). 
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practice.162 As discussed below, a police department’s unauthorized DNA da-
tabase, for example, may not produce sufficient outrage at the local level to 
prompt municipal governments to seriously examine and debate the propriety 
of the police maintaining an unregulated database of their citizens’ DNA. At 
the state level, institutional actors such as the American Civil Liberties Union 
(ACLU) and Human Rights Watch can offer a counter point to law enforce-
ment’s defense of a particular policing practice.163 Although such state level 
not-for-profit organizations may lack substantial political clout,164 they can 
help to ensure that the troublesome aspects of certain police practices are ade-
quately articulated in the public debate. 
III. PREEMPTING ROGUE DNA DATABASES AND  
CASUAL POLICE ENCOUNTERS 
This Part examines two instances of troubling police conduct. Section A 
outlines the maintenance of unauthorized police DNA databases. Section B 
examines the routine practice of making casual street stops that arguably do 
not rise to the level of a constitutionally impermissible seizure. This Part then 
explores the impact that adoption of a robust intrastate preemption doctrine 
would have on identifying and curtailing undesirable police conduct. 
A. Preempting Rogue DNA Databases 
On July 10, 2012, police officers from Anne Arundel County Maryland 
informed George Varriale that he was a suspect in a case involving the assault 
and rape of a thirty-year-old local woman.165 Mr. Varriale, who was homeless 
                                                                                                                           
 162 Taslitz, supra note 74, at 308 (“My argument here has been only that minorities generally do 
better politically in the area of criminal justice at the local level than they do at the state level. But I 
have not argued that poor, urban racial minorities either control local legislative outcomes or even 
have an equal voice there.”). 
 163 Both Former Attorney General Ed Meese and Orange County Sheriff Brad Gates have referred to 
the ACLU as the “Criminals’ lobby.” See Topics; Offensive Defensive; Unfair Attack, N.Y. TIMES (May 
19, 1981), available at http://www.nytimes.com/1981/05/19/opinion/topics-offensive-defensive-unfair-
attack.html, archived at http://perma.cc/J5MF-VWP8; Ramona Ripston, Letter to the Editor, Sheriff 
Gates and the ‘Criminal Lobby,’ L.A. TIMES (Mar. 24, 1985), available at http://articles.latimes.com/
1985-03-24/local/me-30247_1_sheriff-gates-aclu-criminals, archived at http://perma.cc/3W89-WFSY. 
Human Rights Watch has been vocal about the need for lawmakers to investigate and prevent police 
misconduct; see also Roberto Suro & Cheryl W. Thompson, Group Says Police Abuses Persist Because 
of Lack of Prosecution, WASH. POST, July 8, 1998 at A6. 
 164 Dripps, supra note 62, at 1092 (“Sure, there’s the ACLU on the other side. But the ACLU’s 
real strength in legislative deliberations is rarely the electoral clout that organization can claim to 
represent.”). 
 165 See Defendant’s Motion to Suppress State’s DNA Match Evidence at 4, State v. Varriale, No. 
K-13-548; see also Ian Duncan, Maryland Police DNA Tactics Again at Issue in Top Courts, BALT. 
SUN (Apr. 10, 2014), articles.baltimoresun.com/2014-04-10/news/bs-md-dna-court-challenge-2014
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at the time, agreed to let the officers search his tent and voluntarily provided 
the police with both a DNA saliva sample and a penile swab.166 Mr. Varriale 
never heard from the police regarding the rape allegations again.167 
Unbeknownst to Mr. Varriale, however, the DNA samples he offered to 
exonerate himself were not discarded. Police instead uploaded the sample into 
a local databank that was neither authorized nor regulated by any state statute 
or local ordinance.168 One year later, officers investigating a break-in at a 
warehouse recovered an open can of soda that they suspected was discarded by 
the burglar. When the local database matched the DNA from the can with the 
sample taken from Mr. Varriale, he was arrested and subsequently indicted for 
burglary. On August 12, 2013, a judge denied Mr. Varriale’s motion to suppress 
the DNA evidence.169 
Across the country, police have begun to assemble unrestricted, unregu-
lated databases containing DNA samples from arrestees, suspects, and even 
victims.170 These “rogue” databases include none of the safeguards that have 
been included in legislation authorizing state and federal DNA databases.171 
                                                                                                                           
0410_1_dna-anne-arundel-county-police-police-use, archived at http://perma.cc/Y6ZM-MPYQ (de-
scribing the circumstances of Mr. Varriale’s arrest). 
 166 Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, supra note 165, at 5. 
 167 Id. It was later revealed that the rape kit failed to identify any foreign blood or semen samples 
and that the complaining witness alleged that she had been raped after being arrested on separate pre-
scription fraud and theft charges. See Mary Gale Hare, Glen Burnie Woman Charged with Prescrip-
tion Fraud, BALT. SUN (July 10, 2012), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2012-07-10/news/bs-md-ar-
prescription-fraud-20120710_1_glen-burnie-woman-prescription-fraud-oxycodone, archived at http://
perma.cc/7T7D-RJLJ. 
 168 All 50 states have established a statewide DNA database programs. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 
§§ 36-18-24 (2013); ALASKA STAT. § 44.41.035 (2013); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-2418 (2013); 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1105 (2013); CAL. PENAL CODE § 295 (Deering 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. 
§ 16-23-102 (2013); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102g (2013); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 4713 (2013); 
FLA. STAT. § 943.325 (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-160 (2013). 
 169 On August 13, 2013, Mr. Varriale entered a guilty plea to Second Degree burglary that re-
served his right to appeal the court’s suppression decision. See Duncan, supra note 165. 
 170 See Joseph Goldstein, Police Agencies Are Assembling Records of DNA, N.Y. TIMES, June 13, 
2013, at A1 (describing the proliferation of unregulated police DNA databases); Ben Finley, Bensalem 
DNA Database Helps Nab Low-level Criminals, PHILA. INQUIRER (June 24, 2013), articles.philly.
com/2013-06-24/news/40148323_1_stephen-mercer-state-dna-database, archived at http://perma.
cc/K7EV-VDSH. 
 171 Finley, supra note 170, at A1. There are two notable exceptions in that both Alaska and Wash-
ington have included provisions requiring that local databases contain provisions for collection, stor-
age and expungement that do not conflict with the statute establishing the statewide database. See 
ALASKA STAT. § 44.41.035(d) (2013) (“[A] local law enforcement agency may not establish or oper-
ate a DNA identification registration system unless . . . . (3) procedure and rules for the collection, 
analysis, storage, expungement, and use of DNA identification data do not conflict with this section 
and procedures and rules applicable to the department’s DNA identification registration system”) and 
WASH. REV. CODE § 43.43.758 (2013) (“Except as provided in subsection (2) of this section, no local 
law enforcement agency may establish or operate a DNA identification system before July 1, 1990, 
and unless . . . (c) The procedure and rules for the collection, analysis, storage, expungement, and use 
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Had the officers arrested Mr. Varriale and forcibly collected his DNA pursuant 
to the Maryland statute that established a statewide databank, the sample 
would have been destroyed and all records would have been expunged when 
the rape allegation did not “result in a conviction.”172 Because Mr. Varriale 
provided his DNA voluntarily, however, the police were free to maintain the 
record of his sample in perpetuity. 
Perhaps the most problematic aspect of police maintenance of rogue data-
bases is the fact that the practice has never been subjected to significant public 
debate. Legislation authorizing the police to establish DNA indexes and to col-
lect DNA samples has acknowledged citizens’ privacy concerns and has in-
cluded safeguards that allow citizens to have their records expunged under cer-
tain conditions.173 These regulations suggest that the public does not favor the 
wholly unrestricted cataloguing of DNA profiles by the police. Unfortunately, 
although legislation authorizing the police to forcibly collect DNA is generally 
limited to individuals arrested for specific crimes,174 there are other tactics that 
the police can use to acquire genetic samples. 
Law enforcement can acquire an individual’s DNA sample in a number of 
ways. As in Mr. Varriale’s case, the easiest method for the police to acquire a 
DNA sample is often just to ask. Requests for DNA samples are not made only 
to individuals suspected of committing crimes. It is not uncommon for the po-
lice to ask victims to submit to a cheek swab in order to distinguish between 
the suspect’s and the victim’s DNA.175 In many instances, however, police do 
not even need to request consent. Indeed, many individuals may not be aware 
                                                                                                                           
of DNA identification data do not conflict with procedures and rules applicable to the state patrol 
DNA identification system”). 
 172 See MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-511(West 2009) (requiring the destruction and ex-
pungement of DNA information when “(i) a criminal action begun against the individual relating to 
the crime does not result in a conviction of the individual; (ii) the conviction is finally reversed or 
vacated and no new trial is permitted; or (iii) the individual is granted an unconditional pardon”). 
Forty four states include expungement provisions in the statutes authorizing statewide DNA data-
bases. See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 36-18-26 (2013); ALASKA STAT. § 44.41.035(h)(1) (2013); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-610(J) (2013); ARK. CODE ANN. § 12-12-1113 (2013); CAL. PENAL CODE 
§ 299 (Deering 2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-23-105 (2014); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 54-102l (2013); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29 § 4713(i) (2013); FLA. STAT. § 943.325(16) (2013); GA. CODE ANN. § 35-3-
165 (2013); HAW. REV. STAT. § 844D-71 (2013). 
 173 See Phillip Rucker & Anne Bartlett, Black Caucus Members Protest DNA Bill Process, WASH. 
POST (Mar. 19, 2008) http://voices.washingtonpost.com/annapolis//2008/03/black_members_protest_
d.html, archived at http://perma.cc/HC8G-UEQ4 (describing Maryland legislators insistence that 
safeguards be included in the state’s DNA database legislation); Laura Smitherman, Democrats See 
Victory as Session Concludes, BALT. SUN (Apr. 8, 2008), http://articles.baltimoresun.com/2008-04-
08/news/0804080087_1_omalley-special-session-general-assembly, archived at http://perma.cc/
HW9T-BD8A. 
 174 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a) (West 2009). 
 175 See Goldstein, supra note 170, at A3 (describing how homeowners are routinely asked for 
DNA samples ostensibly so that the victim can be eliminated as a potential source for DNA recovered 
at the crime scene). 
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that their DNA has been obtained by the police. Medical examiners have begun 
to take DNA samples from autopsies performed on crime victims under the 
premise that people who die violent deaths may have committed crimes them-
selves.176 The police also collect “abandoned” DNA samples from cigarette 
butts,177 water bottles,178 and a variety of other items that come in contact with 
a suspect’s saliva, blood, or hair.179 Indeed, courts acknowledge that it is al-
most impossible for citizens to avoid leaving behind “a bread-crumb trail of 
identifying DNA matter.”180 
There is no question that advances in DNA technology have yielded sub-
stantial public safety benefits.181 DNA forensics has helped to solve decades 
old murder and rape cases,182 and the same technology has exonerated hun-
dreds of wrongly convicted defendants incarcerated for crimes they didn’t 
commit.183 Yet the wealth of personal information that can be gleaned from 
DNA and the prospect of the government maintaining massive databases of the 
genetic profiles of its citizens raise serious concerns of unwarranted invasions 
privacy and potential misuse.184 In this respect, the government’s collection 
                                                                                                                           
 176 See Richard Willing, Authorities Find More Uses for DNA Databases, USA TODAY Mar. 26, 
2007, at 8A (describing the expanding use of DNA databases and the search for new sources for DNA 
samples). 
 177 Commonwealth v. Ewing, 854 N.E.2d 993, 1001 (Mass. App. Ct. 2006) (denying motion to 
suppress DNA evidence because “[t]he defendant had no expectation of privacy in cigarette butts that 
he voluntarily abandoned as trash”). 
 178 Commonwealth v. Bly, 862 N.E.2d 341, 356–57 (Mass. 2007) (holding that suspect had no 
subjective expectation of privacy when leaving cigarette butts and a used water bottle in police pos-
session). 
 179 See Joh, supra note 56, at 860–61; Albert E. Scherr, Genetic Privacy & the Fourth Amend-
ment: Unregulated Surreptitious DNA Harvesting, 47 GA. L. REV. 445, 452 (2013). 
 180 See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 873 (9th Cir. 2004) (Kozinski, J., dissenting) 
(describing the lack of any impediment “to having the government collect what we leave behind”); see 
also Joh, supra note 56, at 860 (“As a practical matter, why do police choose to collect abandoned 
DNA when looking for incriminating evidence? The simple answer is that it is easy to collect.”). 
 181 See David H. Kaye, The Science of DNA Identification: From the Laboratory to the Court-
room (and Beyond), 8 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 409, 421 (2007) (“These [DNA] databases help police 
to solve cases that have baffled them for decades and to catch previously convicted offenders who 
commit new crimes.”). 
 182 Id.; N.Y. STATE DIV. OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE SERVS., DNA Case Highlights, http://www.
criminaljustice.ny.gov/forensic/dnacasehighlights.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/U8N8-NLGZ (last 
visited June 25, 2014) (providing anecdotes about crimes solved by DNA forensics). 
 183 BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT: WHERE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS GO 
WRONG 5 (2011). 
 184 See Joh, supra note 56, at 874 (“[I]t is a backdoor to population-wide data banking. The risk of 
discriminatory treatment or harassment by the police surely increases when no legal justification for 
their actions is required.”); Scherr, supra note 179, at 505 (“To have the government present in one’s 
DNA and to have the government store one’s DNA without any limits on its use speaks of a limit on 
individual autonomy. That presence and that storage, secret as it may be, might affect one’s conduct 
and self-identity.”); Frank Green, Good Forensics or an Invasion of Privacy?: DNA-Databank De-
bate, Should Everyone be There?, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Mar. 8, 2007, at A1 (“[P]utting eve-
ryone’s DNA in the databank is a cure worse than the disease . . . .”). 
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and preservation of DNA samples is the latest iteration of the long running de-
bate over which institutions are best equipped to establish the rules that regu-
late the police and balance civil liberty interests against pressing public safety 
concerns. 
To date, neither courts nor legislatures have proven particularly effective 
at limiting law enforcement’s ability to assemble and exploit the genetic mate-
rial that they acquire. Courts have uniformly rejected claims that the Fourth 
Amendment bars the police from collecting “abandoned” or “shed” DNA,185 
and it is generally assumed that DNA profiles, once lawfully collected, can be 
retained and searched indefinitely.186 Similarly, individuals who voluntarily 
provide the police with DNA do not appear to retain any legitimate expectation 
of privacy that would prevent the police from maintaining their sample and 
records for other purposes.187 
Federal and state legislatures have not entirely ignored the dangers posed 
by databasing citizens’ genetic profiles. Indeed, the law governing the federal 
DNA database, CODIS,188 bars the government from uploading and retaining 
DNA profiles submitted by individuals for the purpose of eliminating them-
selves as suspects.189 Federal law also provides for the expungement of CODIS 
records obtained on the basis of an arrest or conviction if the conviction is 
overturned or the charges are subsequently dropped.190 
State statutes explicitly authorizing law enforcement to collect and store 
suspects’ DNA can provide even greater protection. The Maryland statute au-
thorizing a statewide database, for example, requires that DNA samples and 
records generated as part of a criminal investigation or prosecution be de-
stroyed and expunged if a criminal action initiated against the individual does 
                                                                                                                           
 185 See, e.g., Bly, 862 N.E.2d at 356 (holding that the defendant had no expectation of privacy in 
the genetic material he left on abandoned cigarette butts and a water bottle); State v. Athan, 158 P.3d 
27, 31 (Wash. 2007) (holding that the defendant did not have a privacy interest in the genetic infor-
mation retrieved from the saliva he used to seal an envelope that the police tricked him into sending); 
Commonwealth v. Cabral, 866 N.E.2d 429, 433–34 (Mass. App. Ct. 2007) (holding that the defendant 
had no legitimate expectation of privacy in the genetic material in the saliva he had expectorated on to 
a public street); Scherr, supra note 179, at 454 (“Courts have uniformly rejected Fourth Amendment 
protection against surreptitious harvesting of out-of-body DNA by the police.”). 
 186 Joh, supra note 56, at 875 (“Thus, assuming its collection is constitutionally proper, an aban-
doned DNA sample can be analyzed as many times as the police wish.”). 
 187 See Washington v. State, 653 So. 2d 362, 364 (Fla. 1994) (holding that once a suspect has 
voluntarily provided hair and blood samples, they may be used in any investigation); State v. Barkley, 
551 S.E.2d 131, 135 (N.C. Ct. App. 2001). 
 188 CODIS is an acronym for “Combined DNA Index System,” the “massive centrally-managed 
database linking DNA profiles culled from federal, state, and territorial DNA collection programs” 
that was established by federal law and is managed by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. See Sasha 
E. Polonsky, “Banking” on Law Enforcement: Advocating a New Balancing Test for DNA Storage 
After United States v. Kincade, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1331, 1337 (2005). 
 189 See 42 U.S.C. § 14132(a)(1)(C) (2006). 
 190 See id. § 14132(d). 
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not result in a conviction.191 The Maryland statute also bars “familial” or “kin-
ship searches”192—the process by which a DNA database can be used to identi-
fy relatives of the individuals whose samples are contained in the database.193 
These legislative safeguards, however, do not explicitly curb the police’s 
ability to maintain their own database of DNA they otherwise lawfully collect. 
Although the officers in Mr. Varriale’s case were barred by statute from up-
loading his DNA profile into either CODIS or the state-wide DNA archive cre-
ated by the Maryland legislature, the trial court found no impediment to the 
police keeping his DNA in their own “rogue” database.194 Similarly, the police 
have adopted the position that the Maryland statute does not prevent them 
from conducting familial searches of the DNA maintained in their own unregu-
lated databases.195 
The absence of any appreciable limit on the police’s ability to maintain a 
private database of citizens’ genetic records has led commentators to call for a 
new approach to DNA analysis under the Fourth Amendment.196 Arguing that 
“traditional Fourth Amendment analysis is poorly suited for a world in which 
‘the body itself may become a rather antiquated way of defining the individu-
al,’” such scholars have sought to extend privacy protections either by propos-
ing legislative solutions197 or by suggesting new interpretations of the Fourth 
Amendment that would expand the scope of its protection to searches of law-
fully obtained DNA.198 
To date, however, federal and state legislatures have been reluctant to take 
on the politically unpalatable task of limiting the police’s capacity to solve 
                                                                                                                           
 191 See MD. CODE ANN, PUB. SAFETY § 2-511 (West 2009); see also, e.g., N.Y. EXEC. LAW 
§ 995-c (Consol 2013). Many other states have included provisions that permit destruction of DNA 
samples after an applicant petitions the state for such removal from the database. See, e.g., HAW. REV. 
STAT. §§ 844D-71 to -72 (2013); IOWA CODE § 81.9 (2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 31-13-07 (2013). 
 192 MD. CODE ANN, PUB. SAFETY § 2-506(d) (West 2009) (“A person may not perform a search 
of the statewide DNA data base for the purpose of identification of an offender in connection with a 
crime for which the offender may be a biological relative of the individual from whom the DNA sam-
ple was acquired.”). 
 193 See Murphy, supra note 22, at 297 (Familial searching refers generally to the idea of looking 
in a DNA database not for the person who left the crime-scene sample, but rather for a relative of that 
individual.”). 
 194 See supra note 168 and accompanying text. 
 195 Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, supra note 165, at 18; see MD. CODE REGS. 29.05.01.06(B) 
(2014).  
 196 See, e.g., Scherr, supra note 179, at 526 (suggesting that rapid advances in genetic research 
and technology warrant a reevaluation of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence to require that the police 
obtain a search warrant before testing abandoned or shed DNA samples). But see Kaye, supra note 
181, at 420 (rejecting the notion that the courts should prefer genetic and DNA evidence over other 
types of evidence). 
 197 Joh, supra note 56, at 881, 886 (“[L]egislatures can offer flexibility and greater protection 
where judicial interpretation of the Fourth Amendment falls short.”). 
 198 See Scherr, supra note 179, at 526 (arguing Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggests police 
should obtain warrants before harvesting DNA from an abandoned item containing DNA). 
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heinous crimes in order to preserve the privacy interests of potential criminal 
suspects.199 Although legislatures have fashioned privacy safeguards for the 
specific databases that they established by statute, lawmakers have proven re-
luctant to investigate and constrain the police’s ability to assemble and main-
tain their own searchable genetic records. 
Similarly, courts frequently refuse to find constitutional limits on the po-
lice’s authority to assemble and maintain DNA databases. Limitations on the 
forcible collection of DNA samples have been rendered largely meaningless by 
advances in technology that enable the police to gather DNA from microscopic 
samples that are all but impossible to avoid leaving behind.200 The courts have 
analogized shed DNA to trash willingly exposed to the public in routinely 
holding that that citizens have no privacy interest in the genetic information 
that the police can glean from discarded items like cigarette butts,201 the back 
of envelopes,202 or even hair taken from a jailhouse barber.203 
Although legislative inaction may best be explained by the lack of politi-
cal incentives to constrain the police, the courts’ refusal to “constitutionalize” 
the collection and storage of DNA profiles may be due to concerns about their 
own institutional competence and the long term implications of establishing 
inflexible rules for a nascent technology.204 Moreover, even if the courts were 
inclined to regulate the maintenance of rogue DNA databases, at best, a court 
could only establish the outer limit of what the police can lawfully collect and 
retain. Courts lack the authority to establish standards for how society might 
                                                                                                                           
 199 See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public Places: Courts, 
Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 662 (1997) (“Politicians, afraid of being 
viewed as ‘anti-police,’ may be reluctant to require that police promulgate guidelines for the enforce-
ment of public order laws.”). 
 200 See Rachel Ross, A Trail of Genetic Evidence Follows Us All, TORONTO STAR, Feb. 2, 2004, 
at D03 (“Everywhere we go, doing anything we do, we leave behind a trail of genetic evidence: cells 
that are naturally shed over time. Hair falls out, blood drips and cheek cells are gradually washed 
away by saliva, only to stick to the rim of a cup, utensil or drinking straw.”); see also Joh, supra note 
56, at 858 (describing the inevitability of leaving behind abandoned DNA); Scherr, supra note 179, at 
450 (describing the evolution of DNA technology over the past twenty-five years). 
 201 See State v. Wickline, 440 N.W.2d 249, 253 (Neb. 1989) (determining that the defendant 
abandoned cigarette butts in trash and thus and sufficiently exposed them to the officer and the public 
to defeat his claim to fourth amendment protection for genetic information derived from his saliva), 
disapproved on other grounds, State v. Sanders, 455 N.W.2d 108 (Neb. 1990). 
 202 Athan, 158 P.3d at 33 (holding that the defendant did not have a protected privacy interest in 
the saliva the police recovered from an envelope he had licked and mailed to them). 
 203 See United States v. Cox, 428 F.2d 683, 688 (7th Cir. 1970) (“Having voluntarily abandoned 
his property, in this case his hair, Cox may not object to its appropriation by the Government.”); see 
also Joh, supra note 56 at 865 (describing court decisions in treating abandoned DNA like trash that is 
“knowingly exposed” to the public and therefore does not warrant Fourth amendment protection). 
 204 Kerr, supra note 7, at 871 (“Judicial rulemaking is limited by strong stare decisis norms that 
limit the ability of judicial rules to change quickly; in contrast, legislatures enjoy wide-ranging discre-
tion to enact new rules.”). 
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want the police to behave.205 Courts do, however, have the means to help over-
come the political barriers that discourage legislators from scrutinizing law 
enforcements’ practice of maintaining libraries of citizens’ DNA. By adopting 
a robust preemption doctrine when analyzing the admissibility of evidence 
generated from rogue databases, courts can “prod” state legislatures to review 
police activity and either affirmatively sanction such strategies or otherwise 
restrain them.206 As discussed above, a municipality and its employees may 
only act pursuant to an affirmative grant of power from the state.207 Because 
states have generously endowed local governments with broad authority to 
fight crime and protect the public,208 police almost certainly can, absent the 
legislature’s withdrawal of that authority, assemble databases of genetic infor-
mation that lawfully comes into their possession.209 State legislatures that en-
acted legislation governing the creation and maintenance of DNA databases 
have not, to date, explicitly indicated their intention to revoke local law en-
forcement’s ability to compile their own private genetic records. As a result, to 
find that the police cannot assemble their unregulated databases, the court must 
conclude either that these state statutes impliedly preempt local governments 
                                                                                                                           
 205 Harmon, supra note 1, at 777 (“Constitutional criminal procedure rights are therefore com-
mands about what the police cannot do, not standards for what they should do.”). 
 206 See Benjamin Ewing & Douglas A. Kysar, Prods and Pleas: Limited Government in an Era of 
Unlimited Harm, 121 YALE L.J. 350, 354 (2011) (“One way in which government actors in the United 
States can promote greater openness and responsiveness is by performing their official roles with a 
self-conscious appreciation for the ways in which they can signal to other institutional actors that a 
given problem demands attention and action.”). 
 207 See City of Philadelphia v. Fox, 64 Pa. 169, 180 (1870) (holding that a municipality “is merely 
an agency instituted by the sovereign for the purpose of carrying out in detail the objects of govern-
ment . . . having no vested right to any of its powers or franchises . . . and therefore fully subject to the 
control of the legislature, who may enlarge or diminish its territorial extent or its functions, may 
change or modify its internal arrangement, or destroy its very existence, with the mere breath of arbi-
trary discretion”); see also supra note 108–109 and accompanying text (explaining that, pursuant to 
the Tenth Amendment, all non-enumerated powers are reserved to the States or to the people). 
 208 See City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 296 (2000) (recognizing broad municipal au-
thority to protect public health and safety); see also Lynn A. Baker & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Constitu-
tional Home Rule and Judicial Scrutiny, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 1337, 1356 (2009) (“[S]tate courts have 
long affirmed the police powers of home rule local governments to promote health, safety, and wel-
fare . . . .”); Wayne A. Logan, The Shadow Criminal Law of Municipal Governance, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 
1409, 1413–14 (2001) (“Although municipalities traditionally have enjoyed wide leeway in matters 
pertaining to zoning, taxes, education, and the regulation of obscenity, it often escapes attention that 
they also enjoy considerable authority to enact criminal laws pursuant to their expansive home rule 
and police powers.”). 
 209 The particular source of the municipality’s grant of authority is, of course, dependent on the 
jurisdiction. For constitutional home rule jurisdictions, the authority derives directly from the state 
constitution, while legislative home rule jurisdictions may derive their authority from state statute. 
Compare CAL. CONST. art. XI, § 7 (granting counties and cities the power to “make and enforce with-
in its limits all local, police, sanitary, and other ordinances and regulations not in conflict with general 
laws.”), with N.Y. MUN. HOME RULE LAW § 10 (McKinney 2014) (granting local governments the 
authority to adopt laws that promote the welfare and safety of persons so long as there is no conflict 
with state law). 
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from exercising a power that they have heretofore possessed by “occupying” 
the DNA collection field, or that the practice of assembling local databases 
conflicts with established state law.210 
Although state courts have largely resisted calls to endow local govern-
ments with greater political autonomy,211 a finding that state legislatures in-
tended to preempt local law enforcement’s ability to establish unregulated ge-
netic databases would, admittedly, require a significant shift in courts’ willing-
ness to apply the intrastate preemption doctrine.212 Nothing in the state statutes 
establishing statewide databases evinces an obvious intent by legislatures to 
occupy the entire field of DNA record keeping.213 Such a finding would not be 
implausible, however, if the courts were to embrace a more robust preemption 
analysis recognizing both the political strength of the law enforcement com-
munity and the concomitant danger of under scrutinized police activity. Taken 
as a whole, the state statutes establishing DNA record systems provide ample 
grounds for finding that municipal governments and their employees are 
preempted from maintaining unregulated records of citizen’s genetic infor-
mation. 
Maryland, where police stored Mr. Varriale’s DNA profile in an unregu-
lated local police database,214 provides a useful example. First, the Maryland 
legislature chose to limit DNA collection to individuals convicted of serious 
crimes215 and arrestees charged with violent crimes or burglary.216 Second, 
when the Governor of Maryland initially sought to expand the statute to allow 
the collection of genetic data from criminal suspects who had not yet been 
convicted of any crime, a number of state legislators, including the Legislative 
Black Caucus, strongly opposed the bill.217 The opponents of the DNA Collec-
tion bill successfully demanded that the bill be “substantially weaken[ed]” and 
that safeguards be adopted to expunge the records of defendants whose charges 
did not result in a conviction.218 The legislature, in so doing, affirmatively 
                                                                                                                           
 210 See supra notes 100–101 and accompanying text. 
211 See Frug, supra note 106, at 1059–60. 
 212 See id. (“[O]ur highly urbanized country has chosen to have powerless cities, and that this 
choice has largely been made through legal doctrine.”). 
 213 Cnty. Council for Montgomery Cnty. v. Montgomery Ass’n, 333 A.2d 596, 600 (Md. 1975) 
(“[O]rdinances which deal with an area in which the Legislature has acted with such force that an 
intent by the State to occupy the entire field must be implied, are invalid.”). 
 214 See Defendant’s Motion to Suppress, supra note 165. 
 215 MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(a)(1) (West 2009) (authorizing the collection of DNA 
from individuals convicted of either misdemeanor burglary or any felony). 
 216 Id. 
 217 See Smitherman, supra note 173. 
 218 See id. (describing how the DNA sampling bill hit a “roadblock” that was resolved when pro-
ponents “forged a compromise that would increase protections for defendants”); see also MD. CODE 
ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-511 (providing for the expungement of DNA records if the cases does not 
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demonstrated its intent that the police were not allowed to permanently retain 
DNA profiles of non-criminal members of the community.219 
The Maryland statute also explicitly barred the police from using the da-
tabase to conduct familial searches.220 As a result, the legislature arguably 
demonstrated a concern about the impact of DNA searches on the privacy of 
individuals who were not the direct subjects of the collection statute. The 
maintenance of private police databases would appear to frustrate the Mary-
land legislature’s effort to ensure that community members cannot be identi-
fied by searching the genetic records of their relatives. Indeed, it would be 
ironic if the police were allowed to effectively include the relatives of homi-
cide victims in their private databases but were barred from searching for the 
same information from individuals convicted of serious crimes. 
Further, unregulated police DNA databases could conceivably frustrate 
one of the DNA collection statutes’ legislative purposes—to assist criminal 
investigations.221 If the DNA collection statute were interpreted to allow the 
police the unfettered discretion to retain indefinitely any DNA acquired 
through non-statutory means, suspects would be well-advised to wait for the 
police to arrest them and demand a DNA swab rather than volunteer to provide 
a sample. Such an outcome would slow many police investigations, increase 
costs, and arguably frustrate the statute’s goal of promoting public safety and 
facilitating the investigation of crime. 
Finally, police DNA databases are not the kind of purely “local” activity 
that municipalities are traditionally empowered to control. Although the differ-
ent models for delegating power to municipal governments make it difficult to 
identify the precise contours of local authority, both the imperium in imperio 
model of home rule and the legislative home rule model leave the state legisla-
ture as the ultimate authority over activities that extend beyond the municipali-
ty’s borders.222 Unregulated police databases are not limited to samples gath-
ered from local residents or even people who pass through the local jurisdic-
tion. Nothing bars municipal police officers from traveling throughout the state 
and warehousing discarded DNA from residents of other cities and counties. 
Because the databases implicate the interests of people outside the municipali-
ty, these databases would seem to fall within the scope of state rather than local 
power regardless of the source of the municipality’s authority. It therefore 
                                                                                                                           
result in a conviction, the case is subsequently reversed on appeal, or if the defendant receives a par-
don). 
 219 Collection of DNA Samples, ch. 5, § 2, 2003 Md. Acts 103, 103 (West) (codified as amended 
MD. CODE ANN., PUB. SAFETY § 2-504(d)(2)).  
 220 § 2-504(d)(2). 
 221 Id. (citing one of the purposes of collecting and testing DNA is to serve “as part of an official 
investigation into a crime”). 
 222 See supra note 105 and accompanying text. 
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seems likely that, so long as the legislature has the will to preempt the police’s 
ability to maintain local DNA databases, lawmakers have the power to do so. 
Needless to say, the fact that the legislature demanded safeguards for de-
fendants from whom the state forcibly obtained a DNA sample does not con-
clusively demonstrate lawmakers’ intention to “occupy the entire field of DNA 
collection,” nor does it irrefutably conflict with the retention of non-forcibly 
collected DNA by municipal actors. Generally, field preemption is determined 
by indications that the legislature developed a comprehensive statutory 
scheme, which, by virtue of its completeness, forecloses the possibility that 
local governments were allowed to develop their own regulations.223  
In many respects, the Maryland legislature’s DNA collection statute is 
striking, not for its completeness, but rather for its failure to account for a vari-
ety of related police activities that implicate similar interests but are not openly 
acknowledged. It does seem incongruous that the legislature would establish 
safeguards for arrestees for whom there was probable cause to believe they had 
committed a serious crime, yet leave the police with the unfettered authority to 
do anything they want with DNA volunteered by individuals seeking to 
demonstrate their own innocence. Absent a significant shift in courts’ willing-
ness to identify legislative intent to preempt local law enforcement activity, it 
is unlikely however that a court would find that the “[l]egislature has acted 
with such force that an intent by the State to occupy the entire field must be 
implied[.]”224 
Diminishing the burden on parties seeking to demonstrate legislative in-
tent to preempt the police would reflect a marked shift in the use of the intra-
state preemption doctrine, but it may well be warranted. Rogue DNA databases 
are precisely the kind of unregulated police activity that tends to avoid judicial 
and legislative scrutiny. State legislators have little incentive to expose law 
enforcement’s practice of maintaining records of the genetic profiles of private 
citizens and little reason to bear the political consequences of appearing soft on 
crime and antagonizing the “law enforcement lobby.”225 Moreover, without a 
substantial change in Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, courts are unlikely to 
intervene either to investigate or limit local law enforcements’ “private” DNA 
                                                                                                                           
 223 See Bd. of Child Care of Balt. Annual Conference of the Methodist Church, Inc. v. Harker, 
561 A.2d 219, 226 (Md. 1989) (“The primary indicia of a legislative purpose to preempt an entire 
field of law is the comprehensiveness with which the General Assembly has legislated in the field.”). 
 224 Montgomery Ass’n, 333 A.2d at 600. 
 225 Dripps, supra note 62, at 1091–92 (“The strength of the law enforcement lobby can be seen in 
its relatively even matches with the NRA—the lobby regarded by many in Washington as the most 
efficient pressure group this side of the AARP.”); see Jennifer Utter Heston, Crime and Rhetoric, 25 
AM. J. CRIM. L. 659, 663 (1998) (“[L]aw enforcement lobbies and correctional worker unions have 
become extremely powerful organizations.”). 
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databases.226 Even if the courts were inclined to extend the reach of the Fourth 
Amendment to cover rogue databases, the rapid evolution of DNA technology 
would pose a significant challenge as constitutional limits on police behavior 
are not easily adjusted in response to changing technological circumstances. 
Were the courts instead to find that state law preempts local law enforce-
ment’s maintenance of unregulated DNA databases, the legislature would be 
exceedingly likely to address the issue. The considerable public safety benefits 
of assembling DNA records and the powerful influence of the law enforcement 
lobby, makes it almost inevitable that a ruling barring municipal authorities 
from assembling such records would elicit a response from the legislature.227 
Prompted by the courts, the legislature would have to publicly debate the mer-
its of broadly authorizing the compilation of private citizens’ genetic profiles 
and decide whether the safeguards that govern forcible DNA collection should 
apply to the DNA profiles the police otherwise assemble. The benefit of such a 
debate would not be limited to any safeguards the legislature might adopt, but 
would also enhance the legitimacy of any practice the legislature ultimately 
chose to sanction.228 
This is not to say that the courts would not retain their responsibility to 
police the limits of what the Fourth Amendment allows. Whatever rules a leg-
islature ultimately chose to adopt, courts would still have the final say over 
what the Constitution commands. But in keeping with a longstanding tradition 
of interpreting statutes so as to avoid a constitutional conflict,229 courts could 
give legislatures the initial opportunity to identify the appropriate rules to gov-
ern police activities. Indeed, prompting the legislature to adopt a complete 
statutory framework for DNA records might ultimately result in greater judi-
cial deference to law enforcement’s interest in developing such databases.230 
  
                                                                                                                           
 226 See supra note 185 and accompanying text; see also Joh, supra note 56, at 868 (“[T]he Fourth 
Amendment’s protections appear to fall short of providing a constitutional basis from which to chal-
lenge abandoned DNA collection.”). 
 227 Elhauge, supra note 139, at 2173 (“Preference-eliciting default rules only make sense when 
one believes they might elicit legislative correction, either in the initial drafting (ex ante) or after the 
interpretation (ex post).”). 
 228 See Luna, supra note 21, at 1155 (arguing that democratic debate about police practices can 
increase their legitimacy and promote greater respect for the police and compliance with the law). 
 229 Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Const. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 
575 (1988) (“[W]here an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious constitu-
tional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such construction is 
plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.”). 
 230 See Murphy, supra note 22, at 339 (noting that the constitutionality of police activities, espe-
cially with respect to “burgeoning technologies” often hinges on whether the legislature develops its 
own regulatory structure). 
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B. Preempting Casual Street Encounters 
Lena gets her son ready for school. 
She says “on these streets, Charles, 
you’ve got to understand the rules. 
If an officer stops you, 
promise you’ll always be polite, 
that you’ll never ever run away. 
Promise Mama you’ll keep your hands in sight.” 
—Bruce Springsteen, American Skin (41 Shots)231 
On the evening of July 22, 2005, Officer Michael Salser observed Steven 
Campbell park in an empty lot and exit his car while talking on his cell 
phone.232 Aware that the neighborhood had experienced a number of break-ins 
and car thefts, the officer approached Mr. Campbell and asked if everything 
was okay.233 Mr. Campbell explained that he became lost while trying to pick 
up his girlfriend from work and that she was on the phone giving him direc-
tions.234 Mr. Campbell handed the cell phone to Officer Salser, who confirmed 
that the caller was, indeed, Campbell’s girlfriend, and that she worked at 
Treeman Industries.235 The officer provided Mr. Campbell with the address for 
Treeman Industries and returned the cell phone.236 Officer Salser then ex-
plained that there had been several recent burglaries in the area and said that he 
would “like” to see Mr. Campbell’s ID in order to log their conversation.237 
Campbell responded that he did not have identification and said, “Officer, I 
don’t want any trouble, please.”238 At that point, the officer repeated his re-
quest to see some identification, explaining that Mr. Campbell could be on his 
way just as soon as he “ID’d him.”239 
According to Officer Salser, Mr. Campbell grew increasingly nervous and 
kept saying “I don’t want any trouble. I just want to pick up my girlfriend.”240 
Officer Salser called for backup and patted Mr. Campbell down for weap-
ons.241 Feeling a bulge in Mr. Campbell’s pocket, Officer Salser asked for 
                                                                                                                           
 231 BRUCE SPRINGSTEEN, American Skin (41 Shots), on HIGH HOPES (Columbia 2001). 
 232 United States v. Campbell, 486 F.3d 949, 952 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 233 Id. 
 234 Id. 
 235 Id. 
 236 Id. 
 237 Id. 
 238 Id. 
 239 Id. 
 240 Id. at 959–60. 
 241 Id. at 953. 
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permission to remove the item.242 It turned out to be a bag of marijuana.243 Mr. 
Campbell was placed under arrest.244 
Mr. Campbell’s story raises a host of potentially troubling questions about 
the scope of the police powers and the rights of citizens to go about their busi-
ness. When can the police approach citizens with offers of assistance? Does it 
matter if the offer of assistance is merely a guise to search for evidence of 
criminality? When Officer Salser stated that he would “like” to see Mr. Camp-
bell’s identification, was this a request or a demand?245 What was the signifi-
cance, if any, of Mr. Campbell’s statement that he didn’t have identification 
and that he didn’t “want any trouble?” 
Street level encounters between private citizens and the police represent 
some of the most difficult areas of law enforcement activity to regulate.246 The 
need to vest the police with the power necessary to ensure their personal safety 
and to fight crime must be weighed against private citizens’ right “to be free 
from government intrusion into their privacy.”247 The difficulty in striking a 
balance between these competing interests is exacerbated by the fact that street 
level encounters are particularly complex, involving a multiplicity of factual 
circumstances and subjective evaluations of danger, potential criminality, and 
the belief that one can refuse an officer’s “request” for either information or 
the authority to search.248 Street encounters also tend to be “fluid”—
information gathered during an initial interaction may lay the foundation for 
                                                                                                                           
 242 Id. 
 243 Id. An inventory search of Mr. Campbell’s vehicle uncovered an unlicensed firearm. Id. Mr. 
Campbell was charged with its possession as well. Id. 
 244 Id. 
 245 The Sixth Circuit found that the use of the word “like” was significant and that the officer had 
merely made a request. See id. at 956 (“The use of the word ‘like,’ as opposed to ‘need’ or ‘want,’ 
suggests that a reasonable person would feel free to decline this request and leave the scene.”). 
 246 See People v. Chestnut, 409 N.E.2d 958, 960 (N.Y. 1980) (“Street encounters between private 
citizens and law enforcement officers are inherently troublesome . . . . This is so because two compet-
ing, yet equally compelling, considerations inevitably clash, to wit: the indisputable right of persons to 
be free from arbitrary interference by law enforcement officers and the nondelegable duty placed 
squarely on the shoulders of law enforcement officers to make the streets reasonably safe for us all.”). 
 247 Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 161–62 (1972) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (describing the 
delicate balancing of interests that underlay the court’s “stop and frisk” precedent); see People v. 
Howard, 408 N.E.2d 908, 912 (N.Y. 1980) (“The principles that have evolved seek to balance socie-
ty’s interest in the detection and prevention of crime and in the protection of the lives and safety of 
law enforcement officers with the interest of individuals in living their lives free from governmental 
interference.”). 
 248 See State v. George, 557 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Minn. 1997) (“We have repeatedly noted that the 
evaluation of the constitutionality of a search is a complex calculation, requiring careful balancing of 
the competing interests inherent in a police-citizen encounter. In such a situation, the requirement of 
voluntariness reflects an accommodation of the complex values implicated in police questioning of a 
suspect.”) (internal quotations omitted) (citing in part Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 224–
25 (1973)). 
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increasing levels of police intervention.249 Finally, the police interact with the 
public for a variety of reasons. Rules designed to regulate how an officer iden-
tifies criminal activity may not make sense in instances where the officer at-
tempts to determine if a citizen is in need of assistance. 
Although the courts have actively regulated police interactions deemed to 
involve physical detentions,250 they have been far more reluctant to investigate 
and restrict police activities that involve less obviously intrusive behavior.251 In 
1991, in Florida v. Bostick, the U.S. Supreme Court held that encounters be-
tween the police and private citizens do not trigger Fourth Amendment scruti-
ny “[s]o long as a reasonable person would feel free to disregard the police and 
go about his business.”252 
Mr. Campbell’s case demonstrates how police interactions that do not in-
volve forcible detentions easily morph into more intrusive investigations. The 
Sixth Circuit held that Mr. Campbell could have simply declined Officer Salser’s 
request for identification and left the scene.253 Unfortunately, by responding and 
explaining that he did not have identification, Mr. Campbell inadvertently admit-
ted that he had been driving without a license—a misdemeanor offense that gave 
the police probable cause to then arrest and search him.254 As a result, although 
Officer Salser never indicated that he searched the defendant on those grounds, 
and Mr. Campbell was never charged with driving without a license, the court 
held that the marijuana recovered after Mr. Campbell’s admission was lawfully 
recovered as the “consensual encounter” with Mr. Campbell had provided the 
officer with probable cause to believe Mr. Campbell had committed a misde-
meanor driving violation.255 Critically, all of Officer Salser’s actions prior to his 
                                                                                                                           
 249 Emily J. Sack, Police Approaches and Inquiries on the Streets of New York: The Aftermath of 
People v. De Bour, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 512, 550 (1991) (describing the “rapid escalation” of police 
behavior from an initial approach to the more intrusive forcible stop and arrest.”); Daniel J. Steinbock, 
The Wrong Line Between Freedom and Restraint: The Unreality, Obscurity, and Incivility of the 
Fourth Amendment Consensual Encounter Doctrine, 38 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 507, 520 (2001) (“Fur-
thermore, as the courts have long recognized, and the police well know, facts discovered through one 
form of interaction can provide the basis to move to a more intrusive level.”). 
 250 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 32 (1968) (Harlan, J., concurring) (emphasizing the difference 
between a forcible stop by a police officer and a casual encounter during which a citizen has the right 
to walk away). 
 251 There have been some notable exceptions as some state courts have found independent state 
constitutional grounds to investigate low level police intrusions. As discussed infra note 263 and ac-
companying text, in 1976, in People v. De Bour, the New York Court of Appeals established a four-
tiered constitutional model that regulated low level encounters that had been found to be beyond the 
reach of the Federal Constitution. See 352 N.E.2d at 571–74. The De Bour decision stands as a nota-
ble exception that proves the more general rule that courts have largely found that they lacked authori-
ty to regulate police interactions not involving citizens’ detention. Id. 
 252 501 U.S. 429, 434 (1991) (citing California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 628 (1991)) (internal 
quotations omitted). 
 253 Campbell, 486 F.3d at 957. 
 254 Id. 
 255 Id. at 958 
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statement that the defendant could only leave after he had been ID’d were 
deemed to be beyond the court’s regulatory power.256 
The Court’s refusal to scrutinize casual encounters has been widely criti-
cized as “out of touch with societal reality”257 and has left a wide range of po-
lice activity outside the scope of the Fourth Amendment and beyond the pur-
view of the courts. This “consensual encounter” doctrine however ignores the 
reality that people, particularly young people and people-of-color, generally do 
not feel free to refuse an officer’s request.258 The Court’s Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence also leaves the police and the public with little guidance on how 
to interact in situations that involve police inquiries that do not amount to what 
courts recognize as “forcible detention.” 
There has been one recent notable exception to the courts’ general refusal 
to regulate low-level casual police encounters. On August 12, 2012, in Floyd v. 
City of New York, the U.S. District Court for the Southern District Court of 
New York held that the New York City Police Department was liable for its 
racially discriminatory use of stop and frisk tactics that targeted young black 
and Hispanic men.259 Although the Floyd decision did not explicitly involve 
casual street encounters that occur below the Supreme Court set in Terry 
                                                                                                                           
 256 Id. (“In short, Campbell could have declined Officer Salser’s initial request and left the scene 
of the encounter. The fact that he chose not to do so did not convert that request into a seizure within 
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.”). 
 257 Steinbock, supra note 249, at 521–22 (describing the consensual encounter doctrine as a “fic-
tional construct” that is “flawed in conception by its use of the reasonable person”); see State v. Back-
strand, 313 P.3d 1084, 1106 (Or. 2013) (“When, albeit politely, a uniformed police officer approaches 
a person on the street and requests the person’s identification, it is a fiction to suggest that most people 
would believe that they have a right to refuse the request or that, if they did, it would be prudent or 
safe to do so.”); Tracey Maclin, The Decline of the Right of Locomotion: The Fourth Amendment on 
the Streets, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1258, 1301 (1990) (“In the real world, however, few people are 
aware of their fourth amendment rights, many individuals are fearful of the police, and police officers 
know how to exploit this fear.”); Marcy Strauss, Reconstructing Consent, 92 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMI-
NOLOGY 211, 212 (2002) (“Although courts pay lip service to the requirement that a person’s consent 
to a search must be ‘the product of a person’s free will and unconstrained choice’ in order to be valid, 
in reality that requirement means very little.”). 
 258 See Tracey Maclin, “Black and Blue Encounters”—Some Preliminary Thoughts About Fourth 
Amendment Seizures: Should Race Matter?, 26 VAL. U. L. REV. 243, 248 (1991) (describing the 
Court’s refusal to acknowledge “the reality that exists on the street” and the role that race plays in 
shaping citizens’ “reasonable expectation” that they can refuse a police officer’s demands); see also 
Jonathan S. Carter, You’re Only as “Free to Leave” as You Feel: Police Encounters with Juveniles 
and the Trouble with Differential Standards for Investigatory Stops Under In Re I.R.T., 88 N.C. L. 
REV. 1389, 1389–90 (2010) (“Tempting as it may be to view an individual’s response to the police as 
a function of their respective guilt or innocence, factors such as race, geographic location, immigra-
tion status, and age may influence the most upright citizen to react nervously to law enforcement.”) 
(citations omitted); David K. Kessler, Free to Leave? An Empirical Look at the Fourth Amendment’s 
Seizure Standard, 99 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 51, 61–64 (2009) (providing empirical evidence 
that people generally do not feel free to end their encounters with the police).  
 259 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 660 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), appeal dismissed sub nom. Ligon v. City of New 
York, 736 F.3d 231 (2d Cir. 2013). 
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threshold,260 it did cast a spotlight on street level interactions that occur be-
tween the police and private citizens. The Floyd decision subsequently became 
an important theme in the New York Mayoral election, where the eventual 
winner, Bill De Blasio, pledged to eliminate stop and frisk tactics that rely on 
racial profiling.261 
Although proposals prompted by Floyd have been restricted to preventing 
improper racial profiling,262 the case demonstrates that the courts can effective-
ly prod elected officials to openly debate and regulate problematic police activ-
ity. Unfortunately, Floyd, like Terry and its progeny, focused on police activity 
involving forcible detention. Courts and legislatures have continued largely to 
ignore “consensual” police encounters.263  
Courts can, however, prompt a legislative debate on the propriety of these 
low-level encounters without imposing rigid constitutional limitations that 
would stifle democratic discourse. Based on the Uniform Arrest Act of 1941,264 
a number of states have adopted statutes that authorize the police to stop sus-
pects under certain specified conditions.265 By finding that these statutes im-
pliedly preempt the police from questioning individuals when those conditions 
are not satisfied, the courts can prod legislatures to wrestle with the difficult 
question of how the police should interact with the public during casual street 
encounters. 
Ironically, some courts have presumed that state statutes authorizing the 
police to stop individuals were an attempt to codify the Supreme Court’s 1968 
                                                                                                                           
 260 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 27 (holding that to stop and detain a suspect officer must have reasona-
ble suspicion that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit a crime). 
 261 On January 30, 2014, Mayor De Blasio made good on his pledge and announced that he would 
adopt a variety of the reforms suggested by Judge Scheindlin in Floyd, including the appointment of a 
federal monitor and changes to the police department’s “policies, training, supervision, monitoring 
and discipline regarding stop and frisk.” See Benjamin Wesier, Mayor Says City Will Settle Suits on 
Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2014, at A1. 
 262 Id. 
 263 There remain notable exceptions. See, e.g., De Bour, 352 N.E.2d at 566 (holding state consti-
tutional grounds to regulate police encounters below the Terry threshold). 
 264 Sam B. Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 343–44 (1942) (quoting the act 
and discussing its provisions). The actual title of the Act is An Act Concerning Arrests by Peace Of-
ficers, Providing for the Questioning and Detention of Suspects, Searching Suspects for Weapons, the 
Force Permissible in Making and Resisting Arrest, Arrests without a Warrant, the Use of Summons 
instead of Arrest, the Release and Detention of Persons Arrested and the Identification of Witnesses, 
Prescribing Penalties, and Making Uniform the Law Relating Thereto. Id. 
 265 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-5-30 (2014); COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-3-103 (2014); DEL. CODE 
ANN. tit 11, § 1902 (2014); FLA. STAT. § 901.151 (2014); 725 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/107-14 (2014); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-2402 (2014); LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 215.1 (West 2013); MO. REV. 
STAT. § 84.710 (2014); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-5-401 (2013); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-829 (2013); 
NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2013); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 594:2 (2014); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 
§ 140.50 (McKinney, 2014); N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-29-21 (2013); OR. REV. STAT. § 131.615 (2014); 
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-7-1 (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (West 2013); WIS. STAT. § 968.24 
(2013). 
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decision in Terry v. Ohio.266 In fact, the statutes substantially predate Terry, and 
the Uniform Arrest Act, on which the majority of the state statutes are based, 
was enacted partly in response to the recognition that “the great majority of 
arrests by police officers [were] illegal” and that “the violation of the law by 
police officers sets a bad example for ordinary citizens and arouses hostility 
toward the police.”267 It is, therefore, reasonable for courts to interpret these 
statutes as setting boundaries on police activity rather than simply authorizing 
the police to do anything that is not otherwise barred by the Fourth Amend-
ment. 
Although the language of the many state laws authorizing the police to 
stop private citizens tends to mirror the Uniform Arrest Act closely, the statutes 
do not use precisely the same language.268 In general, each state explicitly au-
thorizes the police to stop and question suspects when an officer has a “reason-
able suspicion” that the person is committing or has committed a crime.269 Alt-
hough the statutes do not explicitly prohibit any specific police conduct, they 
suggest an obvious corollary—that the legislature believed there is activity that 
the police cannot do absent reasonable suspicion. The only question is the ex-
tent to which the prohibited conduct extends to police encounters that the Su-
preme Court has determined to be “consensual” and, therefore, outside the 
scope of the Fourth Amendment. 
Like a decision finding that statewide DNA database legislation bars the 
police from maintaining rogue DNA databases, a determination that legisla-
tures preempt the police from using casual street encounters to form a basis for 
more intrusive police detentions would likely prompt elected officials to take 
up the heretofore ignored issue of what the proper boundaries of police behav-
                                                                                                                           
 266 See, e.g., State v. Rollins, 922 A.2d 379, 383 (Del. 2007) (determining that Delaware stop and 
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See id. 
 268 Compare, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-5-30 ([An officer] may stop any person abroad in a public 
place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or 
other public offense and may demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his actions”), 
and FLA. STAT. § 901.151 (“Whenever any law enforcement officer of this state encounters any per-
son under circumstances which reasonably indicated that such person has committed, is committing, 
or is about to commit a violation of the criminal laws . . . the officer may temporarily detain such 
person . . . .”, with Warner, supra note 264, at 328–30 (providing the full text of the Uniform Arrest 
Act).  
 269 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 15-5-30 (2014); NEV. REV. STAT. § 171.123 (2013); N.D. CENT. CODE 
§ 29-29-21 (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-7-15 (West 2013); WIS. STAT. § 968.24 (2013). 
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ior should be. Considering the politics of crime and the need for the police to 
engage the public, it is hard to imagine that the legislature would not ultimate-
ly authorize the police to perform many of the activities that the courts have 
left unregulated. By finding that state statutes preempt this otherwise entirely 
unregulated activity, however, courts can promote a vigorous debate in state 
legislatures not simply on the boundaries of legal police behavior but how the 
police ought to act. Moreover, by explicitly authorizing the police to initiate 
casual street encounters, the legislature can better educate the public about 
their rights to terminate such interactions. At the same time, the legislature can 
legitimize those tactics that it wants the police to rely upon to fight crime and 
ensure public safety. 
Unfortunately, finding that state laws preempt police authority in low lev-
el street encounters may be more difficult than finding that statewide DNA 
database legislation preempts the ability of police to establish their own data-
bases. Although the actions of the police, like any other municipal actor, must 
be traced to an affirmative delegation of power from the state,270 the nature of 
that delegation varies from state to state. Municipalities with home rule char-
ters based on legislative home rule are presumed to have been delegated broad 
authority to take actions that the state legislature has not proactively reserved 
for itself.271 This substantial delegation of power comes at a price—the legisla-
ture retains the unilateral right to withdraw that authority through legislative 
action.272 As a result, there is no question that, in legislative home rule states, 
statutes can preempt police activities, including activities of an arguably local 
nature such as how the police interact with citizens on the streets. 
The issue is somewhat murkier for municipalities with imperium in im-
perio home rule. Imperio municipalities theoretically have complete control 
over purely local affairs.273 Thus, the degree to which low level police street 
encounters are considered “local” may affect the degree to which a state statute 
can preempt this local authority. Although courts have generally found that law 
enforcement and crime suppression is of “state-wide concern,” 274 the specific 
behavior of the police in the streets is likely more “local” than a police de-
partment’s DNA database that might contain a genetic profile for citizens who 
have never entered the municipality’s jurisdiction. That said, local residents are 
                                                                                                                           
 270 See supra note 24 and accompanying text. 
 271 See supra note 111–121 and accompanying text. 
 272 See supra notes 95–101 and accompanying text. 
 273 See Briffault, supra note 105, at 10 (“The original form of home rule amendment treated the 
home rule municipality as an imperium in imperio, a state within a state, possessed of the full police 
power with respect to municipal affairs and also enjoying a correlative degree of immunity from state 
legislative interference.”); Darin M. Dalmat, Bringing Economic Justice Closer to Home: The Legal 
Viability of Local Minimum Wage Laws Under Home Rule, 39 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 93, 112 
(2005) (“In an imperio state, municipalities have power over local affairs.”). 
 274 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. 
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not the only people who have casual encounters with the police. Indeed, the 
police may be more likely to stop a stranger passing through town than a local 
resident. As a result, courts may have a sound basis to find that state laws 
preempt the police’s ability to conduct casual or consensual stops even in mu-
nicipalities that have imperium in imperio home rule. 
CONCLUSION 
Using state law to preempt troubling police practices is not a panacea. 
The endemic challenges to policing—the need to balance civil liberties against 
public safety; the need to endow police with sufficient discretion that they can 
protect themselves and the community in a wide range of factual scenarios 
while ensuring that they are not a law unto themselves—are not easily re-
solved. Moreover, the very reason that courts might comfortably assert that the 
legislature intended to limit local law enforcement authority is a presumption 
that the police have a disproportionately strong influence at the state level. 
Given this political imbalance, one might expect that policies ultimately 
emerging from the political process will strongly favor the police over the in-
terests of those communities with weaker political voices. 
Preemption nonetheless offers an opportunity to develop rules in areas 
that are currently lawless. Police practices that occur outside the boundaries of 
the law weaken the perceived legitimacy of law enforcement and diminish the 
public’s respect for the law.275 Moreover, when prompted to act, legislatures 
have not always favored unbridled police discretion. States that have author-
ized the police to assemble libraries of their citizens’ DNA, for example, have 
included various protections that expressly limit how law enforcement can use 
those databases.276 
Finally, even if the ultimate legislative response does not substantially 
curb police discretion, intrastate preemption has the potential to stimulate a 
“vigorous debate” 277 over questionable police practices. By prodding the leg-
islature to either limit or affirmatively sanction police conduct, courts can help 
ensure that the interests of the disenfranchised are at least debated in a public 
forum.278 Such a strategy can ultimately promote greater legitimacy for the 
police, stronger protections for the community, and a more effective function-
ing democracy. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 275 Luna, supra note 21, at 1119 (explaining that the “undemocratic opaqueness in law enforce-
ment discretion [is] irreconcilable with democratic theory [and] generates distrust of law enforcement 
and disrespect towards the legal system”). 
 276 See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN, PUB. SAFETY § 2-506(d) (West 2009) (barring the police from con-
ducting familial searches with the statewide database). 
 277 See supra note 143 and accompanying text. 
 278 See Ewing & Kysar, supra note 206, at 354. 
   
 
